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HOISTING ORIGINALITY 
Joseph Scott Miller* 
ABSTRACT** 
               
 
What looms behind the door marked ―originality‖ is a question that 
is rarely acknowledged by courts and never definitively answered: 
what exactly is the purpose of copyright law?  What values are we 
protecting and why? 
—Diane L. Zimmerman
1
 
 
 *  Associate Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School.  Comments are welcome at 
getmejoemiller@gmail.com.  Thanks to Lydia Loren and Tomás Gómez-Arostegui for an 
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I.     FOUR PHOTOS AND A LAWSUIT 
 
―Progress.‖  ―Hope.‖  Shepard Fairey used these words as part of 
the now-familiar posters he created for President Barack Obama‘s 
groundbreaking 2008 presidential campaign.2  But Fairey used more 
than words: the iconic posters include an image of then-Senator 
Obama‘s face stylized, like the rest of the posters, in red, white, and 
blue tones.  Images of the posters, taken from Fairey‘s recent 
declaratory judgment complaint against the Associated Press,3 appear 
below. 
                      
Fairey had long said he began creating the works with a photo, 
found through a Google search, as a visual reference: ―Fairey begins 
with a news photograph of Obama, grabbed from Google images.  He 
wants his Obama ‗wise but not intimidating.‘‖4  It was not clear, 
however, which particular photo Fairey had used. 
 
invigorating chatloquium in February 2008; to Christian Turner for many lively conversations; to 
Mike Madison, Oskar Liivak, Bob Brauneis, and Tim Holbrook for cutting through an early 
draft‘s clutter with sharp questions; to Graeme Dinwoodie and others at the Spring 2009 Chicago 
IP Colloquium at Kent Law School for a forceful, friendly debate; and to Jim Gibson, Bobbi 
Kwall, and Justin Hughes for a challenging online symposium hosted by the University of 
Richmond Law School‘s Intellectual Property Institute (available at  
http://blog.richmond.edu/ipi/article-1/). 
 * *  This word cloud was produced using a function available at http://www.wordle.net/. 
 1 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, It’s an Original!(?): In Pursuit of Copyright’s Elusive 
Essence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187 (2005). 
 2 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 16-17, Fairey v. Associated 
Press, No. 09-01123 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://cyberlaw. 
stanford.edu/node/6061 (follow ―Read the full complaint here‖ hyperlink). 
 3 Id. at Exs. B (―Obama Progress‖), C (―Obama Hope‖). 
 4 William Booth, Street Artist Fairey Gives Obama a Line of Cred, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, 
May 18, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/artsandliving/style/features/2008/obama-
poster-051808/graphic.html. 
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James Danziger, a former photography director for the London 
Sunday Times Magazine, reported his take on the mystery on January 
19, 2009, the day before President Obama‘s inauguration.  Writing in 
the online magazine The Daily Beast, Danziger first described his own 
curiosity about the photo Fairey referenced: 
 My search began last fall, when I recognized that Fairey‘s prints 
were becoming the definitive visual of the campaign, and I began 
asking everyone from Amanda Fairey, the artist‘s wife, to Holly 
Hughes, the editor of Photo District News, if they knew who took the 
original photo.  No one could seem to pin it down.  Shepard Fairey 
was on record as saying it came from a Google Image search, but 
couldn‘t (or wouldn‘t) track it back to the source.5 
Danziger then reported that, by posting an inquiry on his blog, The 
Year in Pictures,6 he had learned from ―a computer programmer named 
Mike Cramer‖ that—according to Cramer—Fairey‘s posters referenced 
a photo from a 2007 story at Time.com.7  Danziger, digging further, 
discovered that Time.com had miscredited the 2007 photo; eventually, 
however, Danziger tracked the photo on which Cramer had relied to 
Reuters photographer Jim Young.8  Here it is: 
 
 
 
 
The story does not end there, however, because Young‘s photo is 
not the one Fairey referenced. 
 
 5 James Danziger, The Obama HOPE Photo Mystery Continues!, DAILY BEAST, Jan. 19, 
2009, http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-01-19/who-took-the-presidential-
campaigns-most-famous-photo/full/. 
 6 See The Year in Pictures, Will the Photographer Who Took the Image This Illustration Is 
Based on Please Stand Up?, http://pictureyear.blogspot.com/2009/01/will-photographer-who-
took-image-this.html (Jan. 14, 2009, 8:51 AM). 
 7 Danziger, supra note 5.  Cramer posted his visual explanation for his deduction on Flickr, 
the photo-sharing web site.  See Flickr, Obama ―Hope‖ Source, http://www.flickr.com/photos/ 
mikewebkist/3197414552/ (Jan. 14, 2009). 
 8 Danziger, supra note 5.  Young took the photo at a Senate confirmation hearing.  Id. 
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Tom Gralish, a general assignment photographer for the 
Philadelphia Inquirer, continued the story in a series of posts on his 
blog, Scene on the Road.9  Gralish first reported that, according to 
commenter Steve Simula, an Associated Press photo from 2006 was a 
much closer source for the Fairey posters than Jim Young‘s photo for 
Reuters.10  Hours later, Gralish reported finding the precise AP photo 
that Simula had identified—a photo credited to Mannie Garcia and to 
the AP, which Garcia had taken at an April 2006 National Press Club 
event about Darfur.11  Gralish also included another photo Garcia had 
taken at the Press Club event, this one including actor George Clooney 
seated to then-Senator Obama‘s right.12  Here they are, taken from the 
AP‘s recently filed answer and counterclaims against Fairey, including 
the labels the AP gave them in that pleading13: 
 
News reports in early February 2009 suggested that the AP and 
Fairey were talking about the legal upshot, if any, of these events.14  
 
 9 See Scene on the Road, http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/inq-on-the-road/.  At the time 
Gralish wrote about the Fairey posters, his blog had a different URL: 
http://blogs.phillynews.com/inquirer/sceneonroad/. 
 10 Scene on the Road, Another (Better?) Obama Poster Source Photo, 
http://blogs.phillynews.com/inquirer/sceneonroad/2009/01/new_obamashepard_fairey_source 
_1.html (Jan. 20, 2009, 8:47 PM).  Simula, like Cramer, posted his visual explanation for his 
deduction on a Flickr page.  See Flickr, Fairey Poster Photo Source?, 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/ 
25105505@N07/3212113517/ (Jan. 20, 2009).  Simula‘s work is brilliant; please visit it. 
 11 Scene on the Road, Found–AGAIN–The Poster Source Photo,  
http://blogs.phillynews.com/inquirer/sceneonroad/2009/01/found_again_the_poster_source.html 
(Jan. 21, 2009, 3:24 AM). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Answer ¶¶ 54, 142, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09-01123 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 11, 
2009), available at http://www.ap.org/iprights/Answer_and_Counterclaims_of_Associated_ 
Press.pdf. 
 14 National Public Radio, Fair Use or Infringement? Obama Image in Spat, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100301384 (Feb. 5, 2009). 
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Talks, it appears, failed: Fairey filed a declaratory judgment suit against 
the AP on February 9, alleging noninfringement.  On March 11, the AP 
filed counterclaims.  Fairey contended that he used, as his point of 
departure for the posters, the Garcia photo containing both Obama and 
Clooney.15  The AP contended that Fairey used the Garcia photo 
containing Obama alone.16  More recently, Fairey has conceded that, 
just as the AP maintained, he used the Garcia photo of Obama alone as 
his reference.17 
The central thrust of Fairey‘s noninfringement claim is fair use,18 a 
longstanding defense codified in the Copyright Act.19  Internet 
commentary on the dispute has also focused on the fair use doctrine.20  
Indeed, Danziger‘s Daily Beast story highlighted the concept: ―Like it 
or not, Fairey‘s use of the picture is well within the parameters of 
what‘s considered ‗fair use.‘‖21  One need not reach the fair use 
question at all, however, if the expression Fairey copied from Garcia‘s 
photo is not protected by copyright. 
How could that be?  ―To establish infringement, two elements must 
be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of 
 
 15 Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 14, 18. 
 16 Answer, supra note 13, ¶¶ 142-143, 164. 
 17 Motion to Amend Pleadings at 3, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09-01123 (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Oct. 16, 2009), available at http://www.ap.org/iprights/fairey.html (follow ―Fairey Motion to 
Amend Pleadings‖ hyperlink) (―On October 2, 2009, counsel for Plaintiffs learned new 
information revealing that Plaintiffs‘ assertions were incorrect.  Mr. Fairey was apparently 
mistaken about the photograph he used when his original complaint for declaratory relief was 
filed on February 9, 2009.  After the original complaint was filed, Mr. Fairey realized his mistake.  
Instead of acknowledging that mistake, Mr. Fairey attempted to delete the electronic files he had 
used in creating the illustration at issue.  He also created, and delivered to his counsel for 
production, new documents to make it appear as though he had used the Clooney photograph as 
his reference.‖). 
 18 Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 44-50; see also Shepard Fairey, The AP, Obama, and 
Referencing, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shepard-
fairey/the-ap-obama-referencing_b_179562.html (―But the photograph is just a starting point.  
The illustration transforms it aesthetically in its stylization and idealization, and the poster has an 
altogether different purpose than the photograph does. . . .  My Obama poster variations of 
‗HOPE‘ and ‗PROGRESS‘ were obviously not intended to report the news.  I created them to 
generate support for Obama; the point was to capture and synthesize the qualities that made him a 
leader.  The point of the poster is to convince and inspire.  It‘s a political statement.  My Obama 
poster does not compete with the intent of, or the market for the reference photo.‖). 
 19 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  See generally Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach 
to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004). 
 20 See, e.g., Mike Madison, Fairey, Obama, and Fair Use, MADISONIAN.net, Jan. 21, 2009, 
http://madisonian.net/2009/01/21/fairey-obama-and-fair-use/; Erick Schonfeld, Once Again, the 
AP Tries to Redefine Fair Use; Goes After Shepard Fairey for Obama Poster, TECHCRUNCH, 
Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/02/05/once-again-the-ap-tries-to-redefine-fair-
use-goes-after-shepard-fairey-for-obama-poster/; Daniel Solove, Is the Obama Poster a 
Copyright Violation?, CONCURRING OPINIONS, Feb. 5, 2009, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2009/02/is_the_obama_po.html.  I suspect I could list a great many more such examples. 
 21 Danziger, supra note 5. 
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constituent elements of the work that are original.‖22  And the 
conventional copyright view is that photographs are copyrightable,23 
due in part to how low copyright‘s originality threshold is taken to be.24  
What I am struck by, however, is how conventional—how uncreative—
the Garcia photos of the Press Club event are.  I find them pleasing, to 
be sure, and they seem well-composed and clear; anyone who uses them 
should, I think, credit Garcia with having taken them.  They accurately 
convey a moment that took place at the press event they record.  
Photojournalism‘s high professional standards doubtless encourage just 
this type of accurate, anodyne, conventional presentation.25  But 
―original‖?  If conventional copyright doctrine tells us these photos are 
sufficiently original to earn the strong exclusion rights that copyright 
provides, so much the worse—in my view—for copyright law. 
Inauguration Day events brought another, more whimsical 
photographic comparison.  On the parade route back to the White 
House, the President and the First Lady spent some of their time 
walking along the route, free of the limousine cocoon.  Doug Mills, a 
New York Times photographer, snapped a cheerful photo of the Obamas 
as they walked in the parade.  Hendrik Hertzberg, a senior editor at the 
New Yorker magazine, recalled the Mills photo‘s similarity to another 
photo—this one, an album cover from forty-six years earlier.  Happily 
for Hertzberg, and his blog readers, both the album cover image and the 
Mills photo were readily available online.  Here is Hertzberg‘s blog 
entry from January 22, 200926: 
 
 22 Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (concluding that a 
copier was not liable for copyright infringement because the material it copied—a set of white 
pages phone number listings—did not meet the constitutionally-required minimum level of 
originality). 
 23 Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1073-77 (9th Cir. 2000); Rogers v. Koons, 
960 F.2d 301, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1992); SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 
301, 306-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 2.08(E)(1), at 2-129 (2009) (―[A]ny (or . . . almost any) photograph may claim the 
necessary originality to support a copyright merely by virtue of the photographers‘ personal 
choice of subject matter, angle of photograph, lighting, and determination of the precise time 
when the photograph is to be taken.‖). 
 24 See Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1076 (―[T]o overcome the presumption of validity, defendants 
must demonstrate why the photographs are not copyrightable.  This they have failed to do, 
primarily because the degree of originality required for copyrightability is minimal.‖); Rogers, 
960 F.2d at 307 (―But the quantity of originality that need be shown is modest—only a dash of it 
will do.‖). 
 25 See, e.g., BRIAN HORTON, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS PHOTOJOURNALISM STYLEBOOK 
(1990); MARTIN KEENE, PRACTICAL PHOTOJOURNALISM: A PROFESSIONAL GUIDE (2d ed. 
1995); KENNETH KOBRE, PHOTOJOURNALISM: THE PROFESSIONALS‘ APPROACH (2d ed. 1991). 
 26 See Henrik Hertzberg, Positively Pennsylvania Avenue, NEW YORKER, Jan. 22, 2009, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/hendrikhertzberg/2009/01/positively-
penn.html. 
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I cannot help but wonder: Did Doug Mills ever see the Dylan 
album cover?  If he did, was he copying the photo of Dylan when he 
snapped the photo of the Obamas?  Indeed, if Mills had seen the album 
cover, how could he prove he wasn’t copying it when he took that photo 
of the Obamas?  The mind reels. 
 
II.     A HIGHER THRESHOLD 
 
[I]t goes a bit far to deny that genius ever exists.  Artists do, at times, 
exceed conventions, and new things occasionally arise.  Yet, the 
point here is that copyright law does not require genius as the 
foundation for protection.
27
 
 
With greater rights come more stringent requirements for obtaining 
the rights.
28
 
 
Copyright is everywhere.  So is infringement.  Indeed, we are an 
―infringement nation,‖29 covered in a billowing white goo of copyright 
 
 27  David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1, 185 (2001). 
 28  John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
10 (2007). 
 29 John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 
UTAH L. REV. 537, 543 (―We are, technically speaking, a nation of constant infringers.‖); see also 
Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 617 (2008) (―Copyrighted works are today 
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entanglements.30  Are we well served, today, by the conventional view31 
that copyright‘s statutory originality threshold is extremely low?  The 
antebellum federal courts appear, at least on occasion, to have viewed 
copyright‘s creativity threshold as akin to that of patent law.32  In this 
essay, I urge we return to something closer to that state of affairs. 
Copyright did not always permeate our daily lives so thoroughly.  
Copyright‘s current sweep results from at least three decades of 
significant expansion along both legal and technological dimensions, as 
a number of scholars have described in detail.33  Copyright laws now 
seem designed to catch up as much expressive material as possible, no 
matter how trivial or pedestrian: copyright attaches at the moment 
―original‖ expression is ―fixed in any tangible medium of expression,‖34 
without any need to first comply with a notice requirement or other 
formality.35  The legal wrong at the heart of copyright—unauthorized 
copying—is easier to prove than one might imagine: unconscious 
 
used in many ways they once were not.  There is a giant ‗grey zone‘ in copyright, consisting of 
millions of usages that do not fall into a clear category but are often infringing.  These usages run 
the gauntlet, from powerpoint presentations, personal web sites, social networking sites, church 
services, and much of wikipedia‘s content to well-known fan guides.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 30 Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 596 (2008) (―Bounded 
copyright rights have flowed out all over the place like so much frozen yogurt until the terrain is 
completely covered by billowing white goo.  What used to be five or six discrete exclusive rights 
is morphing into an all-purpose general use right, and our understanding of copyright is evolving 
into the view that any use of a copyrighted work that is not authorized by the copyright owner or 
the statute is infringement.‖). 
 31 See, e.g., Yurman Designs, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 32 Compare Jollie v. Jacque, 13 F. Cas. 910, 913 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437) (Nelson, J.) 
(―The original air requires genius for its construction; but a mere mechanic in music, it is said, 
can make the adaptation or accompaniment.‖), with Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 
248, 267 (1850) (Nelson, J.) (―[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of 
fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain 
knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an 
absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every 
invention.‖).  See also The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (stating that ―originality is 
required‖ to earn protection both for patentable inventions and for copyrightable writings); 
Bullinger v. Mackey, 4 F. Cas. 649, 653 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 2,127) (stating that a plaintiff 
asserting copyright in a compilation‘s arrangement of material ―must make it appear that his book 
exhibits a substantially new and original system of arranging material of that character, which 
system was his own invention‖). 
 33 In addition to Tehranian, supra note 29; Wu, supra note 29; and Litman, supra note 30; see 
JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2008), 
especially chapter 3; NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT‘S PARADOX (2008), especially 
chapter 4; and Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007). 
 34 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 35 David Nimmer lucidly details this expansive range of copyright coverage, with ―protection 
[that] applies equally to works of ‗high authorship‘ and to works of emphatically ‗low 
authorship.‘‖ David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 
HOUS. L. REV. 1, 177, 177-85 (2001) (using a series of telescoped pyramid figures to canvass 
copyright‘s expansive scope). 
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copying is actionable,36 and ubiquitous network connectivity can make 
it easier than ever to show—relying on the fact of widespread 
dissemination37—that an accused infringer had access to a given 
copyrighted work.38  Indeed, technological change is as much a part of 
copyright‘s conquest of daily life as any legal rule.  Low-cost computers 
(with word processing, e-mail, photo, music, drawing, and browsing 
applications) linked to a global, high-speed communications network 
routinely transform us into gushing copyright and infringement 
fountains.39 
Numerous scholars have proposed legal changes to restrain, or 
better manage, copyright‘s now-daunting scope.  Some have proposed 
new approaches to copyright‘s infringement doctrines, urging that we 
tighten or refocus the ―substantial similarity‖ inquiry;40 better sensitize 
the fair use inquiry to key incentives and market conditions;41 trim the 
 
 36 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 483-84 (9th Cir. 2000); ABKCO Music, 
Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997-98 (2d Cir. 1983); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. 
Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand, L.).  For a spirited analysis of the 
unconscious copying doctrine, see Christopher Brett Jaeger, Note, “Does That Sound 
Familiar?”: Creators’ Liability for Unconscious Copyright Infringement, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1903 (2008). 
 37 See, e.g., Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 270 (2d Cir. 2001) (―Access may be 
established directly or inferred from the fact that a work was widely disseminated or that a party 
had a reasonable possibility of viewing the prior work.‖); Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 482 
(―Circumstantial evidence of reasonable access is proven in one of two ways: (1) a particular 
chain of events is established between the plaintiff‘s work and the defendant‘s access to that work 
(such as through dealings with a publisher or record company), or (2) the plaintiff‘s work has 
been widely disseminated.‖). 
 38 See Ann Bartow, Copyrights and Creative Copying, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 75, 83-84 
(2003-04) (―[T]he interests of creative people are somewhat compromised by the voluminous 
flow of information facilitated by the internet.  This is because if access to a work is proven or 
demonstrably likely, the degree of similarity required to constitute copyright infringement is 
lessened, and the internet often provides excellent access.‖). 
 39 See James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 214-15 
(2005) (―[T]he everyday use of computer technology routinely results in unauthorized 
reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, and display of digitized content.  Several 
courts have held, for example, that loading a program or file into a computer‘s active RAM 
memory constitutes copying for the purposes of copyright law . . . .  Under these holdings, every 
time a copyrighted work is so much as viewed on a computer screen, the viewer needs either the 
permission of the copyright holder or the protection of a privilege—even if the disk or file from 
which the image is summoned was made with the copyright owner‘s permission and was lawfully 
purchased.  Even if RAM copies do not implicate copyright‘s exclusive rights, a host of other 
common computer activity does, from forwarding e-mail, backing up data, and printing a hard 
copy of an online document to caching frequently accessed files, cataloging Internet sites, and 
webcasting one‘s travels.‖ (footnotes omitted)); see also BOYLE, supra note 33, at 51; JESSICA 
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 178 (2001). 
 40 See Bartow, supra note 38, at 92-102; Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning 
Incentives With Reality By Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. 
REV. 1, 36-38 (2008). 
 41 See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 
969 (2007); Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, 
Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1076-82 (2006); Loren, supra 
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copyright owner‘s right to control the preparation of derivative works;42 
or profoundly restructure copyright as an unfair competition regime.43  
These proposals, with their enforcement focus, do not reduce the sheer 
number of copyrighted works.  Other scholars tackle the question at the 
front end, proposing that we restore formalities that would forestall 
copyright rights from attaching in the first place,44 or develop an 
explicit, minimum-size principle that defines a copyrightable ―work,‖45 
the statutory unit of protection.46  Still others—most notably, the 
Creative Commons project and the Free Software Foundation‘s General 
Public License—create tools that enable authors to signal clearly to 
others that they have a more modest set of enforcement intentions than 
copyright‘s defaults provide.47 
It is interesting, however, that no one has explored in detail using 
copyright‘s central sine qua non, originality,48 as a policy lever with 
which to slow the accumulation of copyrighted works by raising the 
originality hurdle.  This gap in copyright commentary is all the more 
curious because, even after the Supreme Court‘s definitive tug upward 
on originality‘s constitutional minimum in Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Service Co. (reasserting a creativity component to 
 
note 40, at 38-40; Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1483 (2007); Wu, supra note 29, at 630-33. 
 42 See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Changing Nature of Derivative Works in the Face of New 
Technologies, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 76-92 (2000); Wu, supra note 29, at 630-33. 
 43 Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 41 
(1996) (proposing ―recasting copyright as an exclusive right of commercial exploitation,‖ such 
that ―[m]aking money (or trying to) from someone else‘s work without permission would be 
infringement, as would large scale interference with the copyright holders‘ opportunities to do 
so‖); Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 927-42 (2007).  In 
a sense, Professor Bohannan‘s ―copyright harm‖ approach to fair use partakes of this unfair 
competition spirit as well.  See Bohannan, supra note 41. 
 44 See Gibson, supra note 39, at 221-29; Chris Sprigman, Reform(Aliz)ing Copyright, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004). 
 45 Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575 
(2005). 
 46 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 47 On the Creative Commons, see BOYLE, supra note 33, at ch. 8 (describing the Creative 
Commons project).  Boyle was a founding member of the Creative Commons and was on the 
board until April 2009.  Id. at ix; James Boyle—CC Network, 
https://creativecommons.net/jdaboyle (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).  On the General Public License, 
and free and open source software more generally, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF 
NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM ch. 3 (2006). 
 48 Statements of originality‘s core status are legion.  For a concise example, see Leon R. 
Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property (Its Meaning from a Legal and Literary 
Standpoint), 11 F.R.D. 457, 457 (1951): ―[O]riginality is at the basis of the recognition of the 
rights of the author.  It is the measure and boundary of protection.‖  According to his Federal 
Judicial Center biography, Judge Yankwich served as a U.S. District Court judge from 1935 to 
1975.  See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDGES OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/ 
tGetInfo?jid=2670 (last visited Sept. 14, 2009). 
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originality),49 many courts continue to treat the statutory originality 
requirement as decidedly low.50  The two need not be the same, and 
there is certainly ample room to hoist statutory originality‘s creativity 
requirement higher. 
Perhaps a fog remains of the widespread pre-Feist belief that 
originality meant only the absence of copying from another.51  As 
Professor Litman showed, when originality means only ―not copied 
from someone else,‖ it is difficult to take the notion seriously, much less 
expect it to mark the copyrightability boundary crisply52: ―[T]he very 
act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and 
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the 
sea.‖53  This pre-Feist fog can obscure the idea that once ―originality‖ 
also demands creativity the courts can (if appropriate) construe statutory 
originality to require more creativity,54 even as the constitutionally 
necessary creativity minimum remains ―extremely low.‖55 
Perhaps, in addition, well-justified alarm at the prospect of a 
judicially imposed aesthetic orthodoxy—which Justice Holmes 
deployed to such powerful effect in the Bleistein v. Donaldson 
 
 49 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), the 
Supreme Court pruned off the line of circuit court cases holding that the Constitution‘s originality 
requirement contained no creativity component: ―Original, as the term is used in copyright, means 
only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other 
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.‖  Id. at 345 (emphasis 
added). 
 50 See, e.g., Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 
2009) (―The originality requirement for copyright is not particularly rigorous.‖); Assessment 
Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (―Copyright 
law unlike patent law does not require substantial originality.‖); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 
225 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000) (―The essence of copyrightability is originality of artistic, 
creative expression.  Given the low threshold for originality under the Copyright Act, as well as 
the longstanding and consistent body of case law holding that photographs generally satisfy this 
minimal standard, we conclude that Ets-Hokin‘s product shots of the Skyy vodka bottle are 
original works of authorship entitled to copyright protection.‖); CCC Info. Servs. v. Maclean 
Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (Leval, J.) (―The thrust of the Supreme 
Court‘s ruling in Feist was not to erect a high barrier of originality requirement.  It was rather to 
specify, rejecting the strain of lower court rulings that sought to base protection on the ‗sweat of 
the brow,‘ that some originality is essential to protection of authorship, and that the protection 
afforded extends only to those original elements.‖). 
 51 See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.2.1, at 62 
(1989) (―For purposes of copyright protection, a work is original if, and to the extent that, it has 
not been copied from another source.‖); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 
1000 (1990) (―Copyright‘s threshold requirement of originality is quite modest.  It requires 
neither newness nor creativity, but merely creation without any copying.‖). 
 52 Litman, supra note 51, at 975, 1000-12. 
 53 Id. at 966. 
 54 Cf. 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 2:8, at 2-15 (2008) (―Critical elements 
of the statute are of the delegating type.  These include the meaning of . . . ‗original work of 
authorship‘ [in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)].‖). 
 55 Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); see also id. (―[E]ven 
a slight amount will suffice.  The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they 
possess some creative spark, ‗no matter how crude, humble or obvious‘ it might be.‖). 
JOE.MILLER.31-2 1/5/2010  10:48 AM 
462 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:2 
Litographing Co. circus poster case56—deters us from exploring 
whether we should demand more creativity as a condition for copyright 
protection.  It makes little sense to consider demanding more creativity 
when we shouldn‘t be measuring it, or comparing one work‘s creativity 
to another‘s, at all.  The judiciary‘s flight from aesthetic line-drawing 
endures,57 and some would chase out all reference to creativity as a 
needless temptation to subjectivism.58 
But why assume that the only alternative to a minimalist creativity 
inquiry is a stifling aesthetic orthodoxy?  Especially given that patent 
law‘s creativity threshold—nonobviousness59—is framed as the degree 
of departure from orthodoxy, i.e., what would have been obvious to the 
person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time the invention 
was made?60  If we approach creativity not as ―the degree to which this 
work shows good (i.e., my) taste,‖ but rather as ―the degree to which 
this work moves away from conventional expression for this genre at 
the time the author authors it,‖ a demand for more creativity would 
undermine aesthetic orthodoxy, not support it. 
Whatever the reason for it, the apparent neglect of elevating the 
minimum originality statutorily required as a means to stem the 
copyright flood ends with this Article.  I do not suggest that the 
literature lacks for robust discussions of copyright‘s originality 
requirement, including its creativity component; there are many,61 and 
 
 56 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).  Professor 
Gorman called Holmes‘ aesthetic nondiscrimination principle in Bleistein ―[o]ne of the more 
enduring observations in all of copyright.‖  Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic 
Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 1 (2001). 
 57 See Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(―[A] work‘s entitlement to copyright protection does not depend in any way upon the court‘s 
subjective assessment of its creative worth.‖); Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 
923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (―That undemanding [originality] requirement is satisfied in 
this case; any more demanding requirement would be burdensome to enforce and would involve 
judges in making aesthetic judgments, which few judges are competent to make.‖); Esquire, Inc. 
v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (―Neither the Constitution nor the Copyright Act 
authorizes the Copyright Office or the federal judiciary to serve as arbiters of national taste.  
These officials have no particular competence to assess the merits of one genre of art relative to 
another.  And to allow them to assume such authority would be to risk stultifying the creativity 
and originality the copyright laws were expressly designed to encourage.‖). 
 58 See Russ VerSteeg, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, in 1 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1, 20 
(Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (―Preferably, the federal judiciary will completely drop the term 
‗creativity‘ from its copyright vocabulary and replace it with an alternative term such as ‗material 
variation‘ . . . .  This interpretation is essential to avoid the uncertainty and chaos that will 
continue if federal judges persist in inventing their own vague, subjective, and amorphous 
definitions of ‗creativity.‘‖). 
 59 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 60 See generally KSR Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (invalidating an 
adjustable gas pedal patent on the ground that the claimed invention would have been obvious). 
 61 See, e.g., Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1992); Robert Brauneis, The Transformation of Originality in the 
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each has taught me a great deal.  What existing commentary has yet to 
explore, and what I explore here, is the way we can draw on patent 
law‘s nonobviousness requirement—with its focus on departure from 
conventional wisdom as the mark of a protectable invention—to 
dissolve the sterile dichotomy between near-total abdication and 
orthodox aesthetics that Holmes posed in Bleistein.62  Specifically, we 
can focus copyright protection on encouraging those who experiment 
 
Progressive-Era Debate over Copyright in News (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law 
& Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 463, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365366; 
Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
569 (2002); Gorman, supra note 56; Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive 
Relationship in Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853 (2004); Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric 
of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of Public 
Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241 (1996) [hereinafter Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric]; Paul J. 
Heald, The Vices of Originality, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 143 [hereinafter Heald, Vices]; Justin 
Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 
“Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; Dane E. Johnson, Statute of Anne-imals: Should Copyright 
Protect Sentient Nonhuman Creators?, 15 ANIMAL L. 15, 29-34 (2008); Roberta Rosenthal 
Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1945, 1998-2002 (2006) [hereinafter Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation]; Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 871 (2007) [hereinafter Kwall, 
Originality in Context]; Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683 
(2003); Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scènes à Faire and 
Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779 (2006); Nimmer, supra note 35; 
Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 MO. L. REV. 29 (1983); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex 
Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2009); Pamela Samuelson, The Originality 
Standard for Literary Works Under U.S. Copyright Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 393 (1994); 
David E. Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic: Copyright Protection for Compilations and Other Fact 
Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 91 (2007); Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 801 (1993); Mary Campbell Wojcik, The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman, 
Image Licensors, and the Public Domain, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257 (2008); Alfred 
C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright and the 
Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343 (1991); Zimmerman, supra note 1. 
 62 Littrell argues that the courts should impose a higher originality standard.  Ryan Littrell, 
Note, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 193 (2001).  
The only affirmative statement he offers for how to raise the originality standard is as follows: 
―Judges, then, should employ aesthetic pragmatism in originality cases.‖  Id. at 225.  Moreover, 
the piece does not analogize copyright‘s originality to patent‘s nonobviousness. 
  In a pre-Feist piece, Professor Wiley does analogize originality to nonobviousness, and in a 
provocative way.  John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
119 (1991).  Though I agree with Wiley that exploring the comparison has great value, I differ 
with him on key particulars.  First, he urges that trial testimony about originality focus on the 
question of the adequacy of the incentive to create with, or without, copyright.  Id. at 148-49.  
This is sensible, he contends, because the core question is one of incentives: ―Copyright courts, 
then, should define as original any work whose creation requires enough effort to deter the 
creative act absent the copyright‘s exclusive promise.‖  Id. at 148.  Second, he argues that the 
accused infringer, not the copyright plaintiff, should bear the burden of proof on the question of 
originality, id. at 151, and, relatedly, that ―[c]ourts should be modest . . . about their ability to 
second-guess an author‘s willingness to create without the promise of copyright,‖ id. at 150.  I 
cannot square his conclusions with the Supreme Court‘s decision in Feist: Feist both expressly 
condemns an effort-focused approach to originality and puts the burden to prove originality on 
the infringing plaintiff.  Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353-54, 361 
(1991). 
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with expression to push against, and even break past, the norms and 
conventions of routine expression that dominate a given genre at a given 
time.  Such a focus for copyright makes sense within our utilitarian 
framework, given that unorthodox creative expression has greater need 
of protection against purely imitative copying: when it sparks a strong 
positive response from the public, unconventional expression makes a 
highly salient, attractive target for predatory imitation.  We also receive 
a greater benefit from inducing investment in unconventional 
expression: Such expression does more to advance knowledge and 
learning than does pedestrian, convention-bound expression. 
It is a good time for copyright to take inspiration from patent‘s 
nonobviousness doctrine.  Just two years ago, in KSR International Co. 
v. Teleflex, Inc.,63 the Supreme Court fundamentally reexamined the 
workings of the nonobviousness inquiry for the first time since 1976.64  
Exploring KSR alongside Feist proves fruitful.  First, I consider the 
basic justification for hoisting originality to a more demanding level.  
The dynamic is straightforward: The stronger the exclusion right, the 
harder it should be to obtain.  Copyright has grown stronger, and should 
be harder to obtain.  Second, I recount key judicial events in the history 
of copyright‘s demand for creativity as a condition of protection, 
including its sharp downturn in Bleistein, Bleistein‘s nadir in Alfred Bell 
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,65 and creativity‘s revival in Feist.  
Third, I turn to two key judicial events in the history of patent law‘s 
demand for creativity as a condition of protection: the creation of the 
nonobviousness requirement in 1851 (and its striking similarity to 
copyright doctrine of the day), and the requirement‘s renewal in KSR.  
Finally, I consider how a patent-inspired approach to copyright‘s 
creativity requirement—one focused on the degree to which the work in 
question departs from the prevailing conventions of its form—allows 
one to demand more creativity without ushering in a stifling orthodoxy.  
This approach also provides a common theoretical ground for seemingly 
disparate exclusions from copyright coverage, such as scènes à faire; 
conventional musical arrangements; modestly varied derivative works; 
and works in which, to paraphrase the Matthew Bender & Co. v. West 
Publishing Co. court reports case,66 faithful depiction of an item 
external to the work is the work‘s central expressive value.67 
 
 63 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 64 In the October 1975 Term, the Court decided two nonobviousness cases: Dann v. Johnston, 
425 U.S. 219 (1976), and Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976). 
 65 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 66 158 F.3d 674, 688 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 67 See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264-68 (10th 
Cir. 2008). 
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A.     Stronger Exclusion Rights Need Higher Thresholds 
 
Both originality (in copyright) and nonobviousness (in patent) are 
creativity thresholds.  Each serves the same basic function, from the 
perspective of designing an innovation incentive system based on 
awarding exclusion rights.  By deciding how to award exclusion rights, 
we (a) establish the outcomes we prefer, and (b) avoid the 
categorization errors we disfavor, while also (c) preserving a reservoir 
of raw materials on which additional creative projects can draw.  The 
creativity threshold is a key lever for focusing rewards on preferred 
outcomes and avoiding the more socially costly categorization error. 
We can see the creativity lever‘s role most easily when we 
consider the gap that may exist in answering the companion questions: 
Is, in truth, an exclusion right needed to get creation here?; and, Is an 
exclusion right awarded here?  Creating a two-way table that links these 
questions, we see there are two hits (true positives and negatives) and 
two misses (false positives and negatives).  Common sense suggests we 
should award exclusion rights using standards that achieve an 
acceptable ratio of hits to misses. 
 
Which error is worse? 
Is an exclusion right  
needed to get creation? 
YES NO 
Is an exclusion  
right awarded? 
YES True positive False positive 
NO False negative True negative 
 
The balance of errors matters, too.  (Hence the question posed in 
my table‘s upper left corner.)  If false negatives are more socially costly 
than false positives, for example, we should grant exclusion rights 
relatively freely.  What the table doesn‘t tell us, of course, is which 
error is more socially costly—false negatives (denying an exclusion 
right where it is actually needed to incent creation) or false positives 
(granting an exclusion right where it is not actually needed to incent 
creation)—in a given set of conditions.  For example, patent law‘s 
strong-exclusion right, which does not require proof of copying (or even 
awareness of the patent), could function as a counterproductive tax on 
those who solve practical problems by conventional means without 
having learned anything from a would-be claimant‘s invention.  What 
prevents that from happening is a high creativity threshold for patent 
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law that denies an exclusion right where the claimed invention reflects 
merely the conventional, predictable means for solving a problem.68 
The more costly error in a given regime can, moreover, flip over 
time.  Copyright‘s recent conquest of daily life, rooted in both legal and 
technological change, when combined with widespread access to low-
cost means for producing and globally disseminating creative works, 
makes the social cost of wrongful grants significantly higher than it was 
even thirty years ago.69  That change invites the question: Should we 
raise the statutory originality standard higher, above the ―extremely 
low‖ creativity minimum that Feist requires? 
Assume, for the moment, we can find a way to determine whether 
a work embodies more than a bare modicum of creativity without 
converting copyright into an elite taste code.  Is it advisable to do so, as 
a matter of fitting means to ends?  It seems quite plausible to think so.  
In the Anglo-American tradition‘s utilitarian approach to these matters, 
intellectual property rights-to-exclude reduce access today in the hope 
of more products of the mind tomorrow.  In addition, because 
tomorrow‘s creations are built, in part, from today‘s and yesterday‘s 
creations, perfect exclusion would block too much of the work of others 
and thus be self-defeating.  (Put another way, behind the veil of 
ignorance about whether we will be net creators or net consumers of 
products of the mind, we would choose less-than-perfect control.)  A 
key sign that we embrace less-than-perfect control is the settled idea 
that society generally should demand more pronounced creative acts in 
exchange for stronger exclusion rights (or, contrariwise, demand less 
pronounced creative acts in exchange for weaker exclusion rights).  
Copyright has moved toward the stronger-rights pole, as it becomes 
technologically easier both to generate copyrighted material and to 
(unconsciously) ―copy‖ it.  An upward adjustment in originality‘s 
demand seems due. 
Many have noted the strength/justification link.  Professor 
Goldstein, from his vantage point in 1989—pre-Feist, pre-web, pre-
ubiquitous-laptops, and pre-high-speed-connectivity—expressly linked 
copyright‘s lower originality standard (defined merely as the absence of 
copying) to copyright‘s less powerful exclusion rights.  According to 
Goldstein: 
 One purpose of copyright is to encourage the production of the 
widest possible variety of literary, musical and artistic expression.  
The originality requirement helps to achieve this purpose by 
allowing protection for works that differ only minimally from earlier 
 
 68 See Joseph Scott Miller, Nonobviousness: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, in 2 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE, supra note 58, at 1, 2-3. 
 69 See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text. 
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works.  Copyright law‘s originality standard is thus far less exacting 
than patent law‘s counterpart standards of novelty and 
nonobviousness . . . .  The aim of copyright law is to direct 
investment toward the production of abundant information, while the 
aim of patent law is to direct investment toward the production of 
efficient information.  The relatively lax originality standard aims at 
the first object, while patent law‘s novelty and nonobviousness 
requirements aim at the second.70 
Similarly, Professor Olson, from a still-earlier vantage point in 
1983, called out the same relationship between lower creativity 
threshold and lesser exclusion power: 
 Copyright is a severely limited form of protection.  This is not to 
say that a copyright cannot be valuable, but what is protected by 
copyright is sufficiently narrow that in assessing the originality 
standards to be applied in determining whether copyright should be 
granted it is important not to lose sight of the nature of copyright 
protection.  The limited nature of copyright protection also requires 
an emphatic rejection of any comparison with patents, either in the 
standards to be applied in protecting works in which copyright is 
claimed or in identifying the parameters of copyright protection.71 
Today—more than twenty-five years later—copyright is no longer 
the ―narrow‖ exclusion right Olson described.  Comparison to patent 
law‘s nonobviousness standard no longer seems out of place. 
Patent law commentary makes the same strength/justification link.  
In his illuminating study of the nonobviousness doctrine‘s history, 
Professor Duffy examines the exclusion/threshold relationship at some 
length.  Patent law forbids reproducing the claimed invention without 
regard to independent creation (or not); and it protects the claimed 
practical idea across differing embodiments of that idea, not merely a 
particular expression of the idea.  The relative power of this exclusion 
right highlights the need to take special pains to reserve it for instances 
where the advance it protects would not have happened but for the 
promised right to exclude, i.e., to avoid wrongful grants more avidly 
than wrongful denials.  As Duffy explains: 
 The differences in scope of patents and copyrights have long 
been thought to justify requiring very different levels of creativity to 
obtain the rights.  Because patents preclude more than just copying, 
patent law has always required novelty as a substantial element of 
the creative standard that must be met. . . .  The broader scope of 
patent rights may also seem to provide an easy justification for the 
nonobviousness doctrine.  The intuition is that compared to 
copyrights, patent rights place much greater restrictions on the 
freedom of others, and thus, more is demanded from the inventor 
 
 70 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 51, § 2.2.1, at 63-64. 
 71 Olson, supra note 61, at 34. 
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than from the author.  With greater rights come more stringent 
requirements for obtaining the rights.  This justification suggests that 
if patent law granted narrower rights and allowed independent 
creation as a defense, the standard of creativity could sensibly be set 
lower.72 
In our own time, it is copyright that has grown stronger over time, not 
patent law that has grown weaker. 
I concede that, in theory, copyright prohibits only the copying of a 
protected work, not the independent creation of the same or a similar 
work.  But the unconscious copying doctrine, combined with 
widespread access to pervasive, networked content has hollowed out the 
independent creation defense.73  The ease with which we can generate 
conventional expression only compounds the exclusion power of readily 
proved access and the theory of unconscious copying.  Nor is it much of 
an answer to say that the high cost of litigation keeps the worst 
erroneous (or predatory) infringement claims at bay.  Expression 
deterred by (perhaps unfounded) worry over wrongful claims, and 
saber-rattling letters from lawyers, fly under the radar. 
Doctrinal and technological changes thus point toward a higher 
creativity threshold for copyright.  Assuming we can both hoist 
originality and avoid a deadening aesthetics code, we should use party-
driven, case-based elaboration of the statutory originality standard to 
nudge copyright law in patent law‘s direction.  Indeed, courts have 
adjusted originality once before—in the early 1900s—when adapting 
the standard to changing news distribution technologies.74  To be clear, I 
do not think that copyright‘s originality should demand as robust a 
creativity showing as patent‘s nonobviousness.  Patent law‘s focus on 
practical problem-solving under physical constraints that all actors face 
in common, and the patent racing and opportunism that this focus 
engenders, justify quite a high creativity threshold as to useful 
inventions.75  Copyright law can, however, demand more creativity—
keeping the originality standard responsive to legal and technological 
changes over the past thirty years—and still impose a requirement more 
modest than patent law‘s. 
 
 72 John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
9-10 (2007). 
 73 See Bartow, supra note 38, at 83-84. 
 74 See Brauneis, supra note 61, at 23-32. 
 75 See Duffy, supra note 72, at 12-16. 
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B.     Copyright’s Creativity Demand 
 
The road to the Supreme Court‘s 1991 decision in Feist is long.  
With hundreds of originality cases on which to ground discussion, any 
selected history rightly provokes at least a little skepticism.  Many cases 
and commentaries, however, reflect that the cases I discuss here are the 
landmarks along the road to Feist. 
 
1.     Early Rumblings 
 
The Supreme Court did not decide a case that turned squarely on 
copyright‘s creativity threshold until 1884 (in the Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co v. Sarony case),76 almost a century after Congress 
enacted our first copyright statute.77  The lower courts, however, heard 
copyright cases turning on what we now know as the originality 
requirement.  Two decisions from that era are noteworthy here. 
The first of these is Emerson v. Davies.78  Justice Story, riding 
circuit, judged Charles Davies‘ arithmetic book to infringe Frederick 
Emerson‘s copyright in his own arithmetic book.79  Justice Story turned 
first to the question whether Emerson‘s ―book contain[ed] any thing 
new and original, entitling him to a copy-right.‖80  Justice Story 
concluded that Emerson‘s book was original, for copyright purposes, 
because it was clear that Emerson had not wholly copied his work from 
a pre-existing arithmetic book: 
He, in short, who by his own skill, judgment and labor, writes a new 
work, and does not merely copy that of another, is entitled to a copy-
right therein; if the variations are not merely formal and shadowy, 
from existing works.  He, who constructs by a new plan, and 
arrangement, and combination of old materials, in a book designed 
for instruction, either of the young, or the old, has a title to a copy-
right, which cannot be displaced by showing that some part of his 
plan, or arrangement or combination, has been used before.81 
Justice Story thus stressed the presence of the copyright owner‘s 
independent labor, and the absence of copying from another, in 
upholding Emerson‘s claim.  He relied on independent labor, he 
explained, because every expressive work owes a debt of influence, and 
 
 76 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 77 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 78 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (Story, J.). 
 79 Id. at 625. 
 80 Id. at 618. 
 81 Id. at 619. 
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has some resulting similarity, to other expressive works.  According to 
Justice Story: 
[I]n literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, 
things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original 
throughout.  Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and 
must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and 
used before. . . .  No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts, 
unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others.  The thoughts of 
every man are, more or less, a combination of what other men have 
thought and expressed, although they may be modified, exalted, or 
improved by his own genius or reflection.  If no book could be the 
subject of copy-right which was not new and original in the elements 
of which it is composed, there could be no ground for any copy-right 
in modern times, and we should be obliged to ascend very high, even 
in antiquity, to find a work entitled to such eminence.82 
Copyright could not succeed widely if it required the utterly-and-
wholly-new, for such expression only rarely occurs.  As Professor 
Zimmerman put it, ―[w]hat Story seemed to mean by originality was 
something quite simple and straightforward: an original work could not 
be copied and must be created by relying on one‘s own labor, skill and 
financial resources.‖83  The absence of copying that Justice Story 
stressed remains one of originality‘s two core components.84 
The second case of note here, decided five years after Emerson, is 
Jollie v. Jacque.85  Justice Nelson, riding circuit, denied an injunction 
on a musical composition copyright.  Loder, the composition‘s author, 
began with a musical work published in Germany and ―expended much 
labor, time, and musical knowledge and skill, in preparing and 
producing‖ a much-improved work for use in a musical theater 
production.86  The Jacques denied infringing Loder‘s rights, insisting 
that ―the only similarity‖ between their work and Loder‘s ―consist[ed] 
in the melody, which, in both publications, was taken from a German 
composition, called ‗The Roschen Polka,‘ which was well known and 
had been played by various bands in the city.‖87  An expert witness, 
noting that Loder‘s work had been arranged for the piano and Roschen 
Polka was arranged for the clarinet, opined ―that the adaptation to one 
instrument of the music composed for another, requires but an inferior 
 
 82 Id. at 619. 
 83 Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 200. 
 84 See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (―Original, as the 
term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as 
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of 
creativity.‖). 
 85 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437) (Nelson, J.). 
 86 Id. at 913. 
 87 Id. 
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degree of skill, and can be readily accomplished by any person practised 
in the transfer of music.‖88 
Justice Nelson concluded that he could not determine the 
copyrightability of Loder‘s arrangement on the papers, and so set the 
matter over for trial.  First, he contrasted the copyrightable creativity 
that a new melody embodies from the lesser creativity embodied in ―the 
adaptation of it, either by changing it to a dance, or by transferring it 
from one instrument to another‖: ―[T]he original air [i.e., melody] 
requires genius for its construction; but a mere mechanic in music, it is 
said, can make the adaptation or accompaniment.‖89  Next, building on 
the distinction between ―genius‖ and the work of ―a mere mechanic,‖ 
Justice Nelson framed the originality question in the case this way: 
 The musical composition contemplated by the statute must, 
doubtless, be substantially a new and original work; and not a copy 
of a piece already produced, with additions and variations, which a 
writer of music with experience and skill might readily make.  Any 
other construction of the act would fail to afford the protection 
intended to the original piece from which the [melody] is 
appropriated.90 
Although he lacked the expertise to determine whether Loder‘s 
arrangement was the work of ―a mere mechanic in music‖ and thus 
unprotectable—―[p]ersons of skill and experience in the art must be 
called in to assist in the determination of th[at] question‖91—Justice 
Nelson plainly did not think Loder‘s independent labor was enough, by 
itself, to earn copyright protection.  Sufficient creativity, surpassing that 
of a mere mechanic, was also required. 
A year after Jollie, Justice Nelson wrote another opinion that is 
central to my comparison of copyright to patent.  I take up that patent 
law decision, Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,92 below.  Suffice it to say, for 
the moment, that Justice Nelson described patent law‘s creativity 
threshold in the same terms he used in Jollie.93  The contemporary taboo 
against comparing originality to nonobviousness is just that—
contemporary. 
 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 913-14 (emphasis added). 
 91 Id. 
 92 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851). 
 93 I learned of Justice Nelson‘s decision in Jollie, and its similarity to Hotchkiss, at a talk 
Professors Brauneis and Duffy gave at DePaul Law School on August 10, 2007.  See Audio and 
video podcasts: Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, held by the Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law, the DePaul University Center for Intellectual Property Law & Information 
Technology, the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, and the Stanford Program in Law, 
Science & Technology (Aug. 9-10, 2007), available at http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers 
%5Finstitutes/ciplit/ipsc/schedule.asp.  Their talk, entitled ―The Curious Divergence of Patent 
and Copyright Law,‖ inspired this project.  I thank them for it. 
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2.     A High Bar 
 
The Emerson and Jollie cases give us two strands for originality: 
independent effort (not mere copying), and an adequate amount of 
creativity.  Two other cases from the 1800s—this time, Supreme Court 
cases—considered the kind of creative expression a work must embody 
to merit copyright protection.  The first, like Jollie, suggests that patent 
and copyright require a similar type, if not the same amount, of 
creativity.  The second involved a work that the Court put well above 
the minimum required level of creativity for copyright.  Justice Miller 
wrote both unanimous opinions. 
In The Trade-Mark Cases,94 the Court overturned three convictions 
under the then-current federal trademark statute, concluding that 
Congress had overstepped its powers under the Progress Clause95 and 
the Commerce Clause.96  The case did not turn on copyright validity.  
The Court did, however, differentiate protectible trademark use from the 
achievements rewarded by patent and copyright.  Establishing a valid 
mark, the Court observed, ―requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, 
no laborious thought.  It is simply founded on priority of appropriation,‖ 
by use in commerce.97  The trademark system‘s frequent reliance on 
long-known words as marks is quite different from the patent system‘s 
demand for an inventive product or process: 
 The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or 
discovery.  The trade-mark recognized by the common law is 
generally the growth of a considerable period of use, rather than a 
 
 94 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
 95 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress ―[t]o promote the progress of science 
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries‖).  Naming this clause presents a bit of a value choice.  Some 
call it the Copyright & Patent Clause, although neither of these terms appears in it.  Others call it 
the Intellectual Property Clause, although, again, the phrase does not appear there, and the word 
―property,‖ which is used elsewhere in the Constitution (but not here), is rich with connotations.  
Still others call it the Exclusive Rights Clause, which at least has the virtue of textual connection; 
but that name focuses on the means Congress is empowered to use, rather than on the end it is 
empowered to pursue.  I prefer to call it the Progress Clause. 
 96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress ―[t]o regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes‖). 
 97 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.  In the same vein, the Court noted that ―[t]he trade-
mark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something already in existence as the distinctive 
symbol of the party using it.‖ Id.  This remains true today.  One type of mark—a fanciful mark—
is a word fabricated especially for use as a mark, such as Kodak or Exxon.  Coining such a mark 
takes some creativity, to be sure.  But marks comprising well-known words or symbols are also 
valid, so long as they are capable of distinguishing the mark owner‘s good or service from the 
offerings of others.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining ―trademark‖).  ―Apple‖ for computers (an 
arbitrary mark), ―Tide‖ for detergent (a suggestive mark), and ―Coca-Cola‖ for soft drinks (a 
descriptive mark), all comprise words that existed long before the development of the products 
for which they serve as trademarks. 
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sudden invention.  It is often the result of accident rather than design, 
and when under the act of Congress it is sought to establish it by 
registration, neither originality, invention, discovery, science, nor art 
is in any way essential to the right conferred by that act.98 
Note that the Court both denied that ―invention‖ is a necessary 
feature of a valid mark, and used the word ―originality‖—which we 
now associate so strongly with copyright—on a par with ―invention,‖ 
the more patent-related term to the modern ear.  The Court then found 
that trademark is as distant from copyright as it is from patent: 
If we should endeavor to classify it under the head of writings of 
authors, the objections are equally strong.  In this, as in regard to 
inventions, originality is required.  And while the word writings may 
be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original designs for 
engravings, prints, [etc.], it is only such as are original, and are 
founded in the creative powers of the mind.  The writings which are 
to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the 
form of books, prints, engravings and the like.99 
Once again, the Court used ―originality‖ to denote creativity, in both 
copyright and patent.  A century later, in Feist, the Court expressly 
relied on this portion of The Trade-Mark Cases to explain its conclusion 
that ―originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of 
creativity.‖100 
Five years after The Trade-Mark Cases, in Burrow-Giles 
Lithographing Co. v. Sarony,101 the Court upheld the copyrightability of 
a posed portrait photograph.  Napoleon Sarony, the famed portrait 
photographer,102 had taken a series of photographs of Oscar Wilde.103  
In Sarony‘s infringement suit, the central issue was whether Congress 
had exceeded its Progress Clause power in extending copyright 
protection to photographs.104  The Court considered the expansion of 
federal copyright protection from its humbler beginnings in 1790 
(covering maps, charts, and books) to its then-current embrace of 
photographs, dramatic or musical compositions, engravings, paintings, 
statues, and more.105  The Court construed the key constitutional term, 
―writings,‖ to mean ―literary productions . . . includ[ing] all forms of 
 
 98 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94. 
 99 Id. (emphases added). 
 100 Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (emphasis added). 
 101 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 102 ―By 1864, [Sarony] had established his studio in New York City, where he made a fortune 
taking portraits of the leading actors and literary figures of the period.‖  WAYNE CRAVEN, 
AMERICAN ART: HISTORY AND CULTURE 373 (2003). 
 103 The photos are at Sarony Photographs of Wilde, http://www.humnet.ucla.edu/ 
humnet/clarklib/wildphot/sarony.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).  The photo at issue in Burrow-
Giles, Sarony‘s Wilde #18, is the sixth image on this web page. 
 104 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 56. 
 105 Id. at 56-57. 
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writing, printing, engraving, etching, [etc.], by which the ideas in the 
mind of the author are given visible expression.‖106  Photographs plainly 
met this standard, at least ―so far as they are representatives of original 
intellectual conceptions of the author.‖107  And Sarony‘s photograph of 
Wilde, the Court concluded, was ―an original work of art, the product of 
[Sarony‘s] intellectual invention.‖108  Specifically, 
[t]he third finding of facts says, in regard to the photograph in 
question, that it is a ―useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and 
graceful picture, and that plaintiff made the same . . . entirely from 
his own original mental conception, to which he gave visible form by 
posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and 
arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in 
said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful 
outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and 
evoking the desired expression, and from such disposition, 
arrangement, or representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he 
produced the picture in suit.‖109 
In other words, ―[t]he photograph by Sarony was one in which the 
author did not merely reproduce reality mechanically, but one where he 
manipulated it to achieve a desired effect.‖110  Given Sarony‘s creative 
and graceful work, copyright attached. 
Two things emerge from this brief survey.  First, patent and 
copyright were not sharply disparate regimes with wholly separate 
vocabularies.  Both required creativity as a condition for protection, and 
words we now think of as contrasting terms of art—originality and 
invention—served equally well for one another in the Court‘s cases.  
Second, as Professor Zimmerman concluded from her survey of these 
and other cases, ―they might well have suggested that, at the close of the 
nineteenth century, copyright was intended to promote socially valuable 
 
 106 Id. at 58 (emphasis added). 
 107 Id.  The Court expressly reserved judgment on the question whether copyright could 
protect what it called ―the ordinary production of a photograph,‖ i.e., ―the manual operation . . . of 
transferring to the [photographic] plate the visible representation of some existing object, the 
accuracy of this representation being its highest merit.‖  Id. at 59.  As Professor Heald notes, 
Sarony ―therefore provided no minimum baseline for its requirement of ‗original intellectual 
conception‘ and clearly passed on the opportunity to declare purely mimetic works of image 
reproduction unoriginal and uncopyrightable.‖  Heald, Vices, supra note 61, at 148.  More 
recently, a district court did hold such an art reproduction photograph unoriginal.  See Bridgeman 
Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Wojcik, supra note 61. 
 108 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60.  The opinion equates ―originalty‖ and ―invention‖ 
throughout this analysis, id. at 59-60, showing none of the modern fussiness at separating 
copyright from patent terminology as it repeatedly uses both words to refer interchangeably to 
copyright and patent requirements. 
 109 Id. at 60. 
 110 Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 201. 
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kinds of work that also exhibited some fairly high level of human 
imagination or intellectual input.‖111  Then came Justice Holmes. 
 
3.     Abandoning Creativity Review 
 
In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,112 the Court once 
again confronted the question whether copyright protected particular 
works—in this case, color posters used to advertise a circus.113  The 
Sixth Circuit had denied copyright protection to the posters, extending a 
Supreme Court decision denying copyright protection to an ink bottle 
label114 to preclude copyright protection for posters that ―ha[ve] no 
other use than that of a mere advertisement, and no value aside from 
this function.‖115  The Supreme Court, Justice Holmes writing for seven, 
reversed. 
There can be little doubt after looking at the fanciful, florid circus 
posters from this era that the posters in Bleistein readily met the 
creativity standard the Court expressed in Sarony.116  The posters are no 
less graceful and creative, in their own way, than Sarony‘s photo of 
Wilde.  Justice Holmes, however, sought to change the Sarony standard, 
rather than to apply it.  Indeed, Bleistein‘s ―exceedingly low standard‖ 
of creativity ―was the end of any effort to impose a meaningful 
threshold requirement for originality,‖117 until the Supreme Court 
renewed the effort in Feist. 
Justice Holmes made short work of the Sixth Circuit‘s reasoning: 
―A picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject of 
copyright that it is used for an advertisement.‖118  More important, he 
reoriented the originality inquiry from a work-centered creativity 
 
 111 Id. 
 112 188 U.S. 239 (1902). 
 113 At Princeton Univ. Library, Circus Posters, http://libweb5.princeton.edu/visual_materials/ 
Circus/TC093.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009), you can see images of color circus posters from 
the late 1800s and early 1900s.  Sadly, the site does not have images of Wallace Show posters.  
However, a search for ―Great Wallace Shows‖ on Google‘s image search page will usually turn 
up images of the sorts of posters at issue in the Supreme Court case. 
 114 Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891). 
 115 104 F. 993, 996 (6th Cir. 1900). 
 116 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT‘S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX 49 (Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (1994) (―The creativity criterion that the Supreme Court 
had adopted in the Oscar Wilde case offered a tempting dividing line between copyrightable and 
uncopyrightable subject matter, and would certainly have sustained copyright in the elaborate 
circus posters.‖). 
 117 Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 203-04. 
 118 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1902).  Judge Learned Hand 
echoed Holmes when, as a trial judge, Hand opined that ―no photograph, however simple, can be 
unaffected by the personal influence of the author, and no two will be absolutely alike.‖  
Jewelers‘ Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
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assessment (of the type used in Sarony and, before it, in Jollie) to an 
author-centered effort assessment (of the type Justice Story had used in 
Emerson).  Beginning from the premise that multiple artists could each 
claim a valid copyright in their respective drawings of the same actual 
face,119 he grounded copyright in the individual artist‘s effort: 
The copy [i.e., the work] is the personal reaction of an individual 
upon nature.  Personality always contains something unique.  It 
expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest 
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man‘s 
alone.  That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction 
in the words of the act.120 
The focus is, again, not on ―the quality or quantity of authorial 
input,‖121 but on whether the work shows the author‘s ―personal 
reaction‖—―something unique,‖ ―something irreducible‖—rather than a 
self-concealing imitation of another‘s work.  And the merit of protecting 
the author‘s effort, in a case such as this, is only underscored by the 
accused infringer‘s desire to make unauthorized copies of the work: 
―That these pictures had their worth and their success is sufficiently 
shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs‘ 
rights.‖122 
Why shift away from an external, more demanding measure of 
creativity toward an easily-met effort standard?  Here Justice Holmes 
raised the spectre of stifling judicial aesthetic edicts distorting the 
copyright field.  The argument reverberates even now, because it is 
quite compelling: 
 It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.  At 
the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation.  Their very novelty would make them repulsive until 
the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke.  
It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of 
Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection 
 
 119 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249. 
 120 Id. at 250. 
 121 Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 202. 
 122 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252.  Professor Jaszi, in his analysis of Bleistein, highlights this 
connection between a minimalist originality standard and a commodities-based view of 
expression: 
  The Bleistein opinion, with its emphasis on the ―work‖ and its abdication of a 
judicial role as aesthetic arbiter, both effaces and generalizes ―authorship,‖ leaving this 
category with little or no meaningful content and none of its traditional associations.  
In so doing, the opinion rationalizes a significant expansion of copyright protection.  In 
effect, the revision of ―authorship‖ in Bleistein was instrumental in broadening and 
generalizing the category of works that could be considered as copyrightable 
commodities. 
Jaszi, supra note 61, at 483 (footnote omitted). 
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when seen for the first time.  At the other end, copyright would be 
denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the 
judge.  Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a 
commercial value—it would be bold to say that they have not an 
aesthetic and educational value—and the taste of any public is not to 
be treated with contempt.123 
The doleful regime Justice Holmes imagines, and then deflects, 
rests on an important premise—namely, that judging creativity, beyond 
a minimal check for an author‘s ―personal reaction‖ in the work, entails 
judging works based on one‘s own aesthetic taste.  Some works will be 
―repulsive,‖ and they are ―sure to miss appreciation.‖  He describes a 
reaction from personal taste.  Other works will be thought vulgar, 
―appeal[ing] to a public less educated than the judge.‖  Again, he 
describes a legal judgment founded on a judicial reaction from taste. 
But is the premise accurate?  Is taste the only measure of creativity, 
if we venture past an inspection for a sign—however minimal—of the 
author‘s personality?  Our experience with patent law‘s nonobviousness 
requirement suggests that taste is not the only measure of creativity.  
We can also assess creativity as a departure from that which is 
conventional, routine, or pedestrian.  Rather than judge a work based 
solely on our own taste, we can judge a work by the ways in which the 
author‘s individual voice stands apart from conventional expression.  In 
a way, this alternative dissolves Justice Holmes‘ fear by charging right 
at it: don‘t dis Manet because he paints unconventionally, reward him 
precisely because he does so.  Perhaps one can avoid imposing an 
orthodoxy by rewarding what is, for its time and type, unorthodox. 
I return to this alternative creativity inquiry after reviewing both 
Feist‘s turn away from Bleistein‘s minimalism and key features of the 
nonobviousness doctrine.  Before discussing Feist, however, it is 
instructive to consider the absurd nadir of Bleistein‘s ―personal 
reaction‖ inquiry: Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.124 
In Alfred Bell, the Second Circuit upheld a copyright infringement 
judgment that Alfred Bell & Co. had secured against Catalda Fine Arts.  
Alfred Bell had made mezzotint engraving reproductions125 of eight 
 
 123 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.  This is known as the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle.  See 
supra note 56. 
 124 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).  On Bell‘s absurdity, see Jaszi, supra note 61, at 483: ―The 
disassociation of ‗authorship‘ from ‗genius,‘ and its reassociation with the meanest levels of 
creative activity, continued apace in copyright cases after Bleistein.  Perhaps the most striking 
example of this tendency is the noted decision in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.‖ 
 125 To learn about mezzotint engraving, with examples, consult the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art‘s ―Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History.‖ Among its many ―Thematic Essays‖ is one called 
―The Printed Image in the West: Mezzotint.‖  Elizabeth E. Barker, The Printed Image in the 
West: Mezzotint, in METRO. MUSEUM OF ART, HEILBRUNN TIMELINE OF ART HISTORY (2003), 
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/mztn/hd_mztn.htm. 
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famous paintings.126  Catalda Fine Arts made lithographs from Alfred 
Bell‘s engravings.  As the trial court explained, ―[t]he artists employed 
to produce these mezzotint engravings in suit attempted faithfully to 
reproduce paintings in the mezzotint medium so that the basic idea, 
arrangement, and color scheme of each painting are those of the original 
artist.‖127  At the same time, however, 
[t]he work of the engraver upon the plate requires the individual 
conception, judgment and execution by the engraver on the depth 
and shape of the depressions in the plate to be made by the scraping 
process in order to produce in this other medium the engraver‘s 
concept of the effect of the oil painting.  No two engravers can 
produce identical interpretations of the same oil painting.128 
The trial court concluded that the engraver‘s personal interpretation, 
varied as it was from that of other engravers and from the underlying 
painting, met the Bleistein originality threshold.129  The Second Circuit 
agreed.130 
Given Bleistein‘s originality standard, and the trial court‘s findings 
about the inherent idiosyncrasies of each engraver‘s mezzotint 
reproduction, in the copper plate medium, of a painting on canvas, one 
is hardly surprised that the Second Circuit upheld the trial court‘s 
originality judgment here.  What is surprising is the extreme to which 
the Second Circuit took Bleistein‘s ―personal reaction‖ theory of 
originality.  At first, Judge Frank, writing for the court, hewed closely to 
Bleistein: 
All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is 
that the author contributed something more than a merely trivial 
variation, something recognizably his own.  Originality in this 
context means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.  No 
matter how poor artistically the author‘s addition, it is enough if it be 
his own.131 
But then the court veered off into the absurd, and to a point that 
was not necessary to decide the copyrightability of the mezzotints in 
suit.  Its leaping-off point was the basic fact that a mezzotint is not a 
precise, exacting imitation of a painting: 
There is evidence that they were not intended to, and did not, imitate 
the paintings they reproduced.  But even if their substantial 
departures from the paintings were inadvertent, the copyrights would 
be valid.  A copyist‘s bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a 
shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently 
 
 126 74 F. Supp. 973, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 975 & n.3. 
 130 191 F.2d 99, 102-05 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 131 Id. at 102-03 (internal quotations, footnotes, and citations omitted). 
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distinguishable variations.  Having hit upon such a variation 
unintentionally, the ―author‖ may adopt it as his and copyright it.132 
This thunderclap theory of originality sinks below even Bleistein‘s 
―personal reaction‖ theory because it severs the link between expression 
and volition.  And we are far removed, indeed, from the Sarony Court‘s 
equation of creativity with an author‘s thoughtful, considered 
engagement with the stuff of expression, whereby ―the ideas in the mind 
of the author are given visible expression.‖133 
In a way, Judge Frank‘s conclusion about Bleistein‘s logical end 
point is hard to fault.  Having turned the creativity inquiry in on itself by 
focusing on the author‘s effort (rather than on the nature of her creative 
achievement in the work), how can one reject the conclusion that a 
spasm from loud noise is uniquely that author‘s spasm?  By adopting 
the spasm‘s effect, rather than rejecting it, the author renders it a 
copyrightable personal reaction.  To one who, like me, thinks 
copyright‘s originality standard needs a more, not less, demanding acid 
test of creativity, Bell‘s thunderclap theory is a reductio ad absurdum 
that condemns Bleistein‘s personality-based approach. 
 
4.     Restoring a Constitutional Creativity Minimum 
 
The Supreme Court did not return to the question of copyright‘s 
creativity threshold until 1991, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.134  Feist holds that a ―white pages‖ book of 
residential phone numbers, listed alphabetically by surname, is 
uncopyrightable because it falls below the constitutionally mandated 
minimum creativity level that copyright requires.135  Feist re-reorients 
the creativity inquiry, restoring Sarony‘s focus on the work‘s objective 
character (and displacing Bleistein‘s mere search for signs of the 
author‘s personal reaction).  Feist also, like Jollie, The Trade-Mark 
Cases, and Sarony, casts copyright‘s creativity talk in patent-like 
language.  Because Feist sets a constitutional floor, rather than a 
statutory ceiling,136 we have the flexibility to pursue the patent law 
comparison on statutory grounds.137 
 
 132 Id. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted). 
 133 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). 
 134 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 135 Id. at 346-47 (discussing the constitutionally mandated nature of the creativity 
requirement); id. at 362-64 (holding that Rural‘s listings book falls below the constitutionally 
required minimum). 
 136 It is settled that Feist provides a constitutional, not a statutory, creativity minimum.  See, 
e.g., Samuelson, supra note 61, at 395 (―Even though there was a perfectly adequate statutory 
ground for the decision, the Court—not once, but numerous times—indicated that it believed that 
Congress lacks power to amend the copyright statute to provide protection to data compilations 
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Justice O‘Connor begins the Court‘s analysis in Feist by 
reaffirming that ―[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality.‖138  
Originality, in turn, requires creativity: ―The originality requirement 
articulated in The Trade-Mark Cases and [Sarony] remains the 
touchstone of copyright protection today.‖139  At the same time, the 
creativity the Constitution demands is modest: ―To be sure, the requisite 
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.  
The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess 
some creative spark, ‗no matter how crude, humble or obvious‘ it might 
be.‖140  After a thorough critique of the ―sweat of the brow‖ theory of 
copyright141—according to which one obtains copyright protection for a 
fact compilation by virtue of the labor one put into gathering the facts it 
contains142—Justice O‘Connor concludes that a fact compilation‘s 
copyright, if it exists at all, rests on whether the author‘s ―selection, 
coordination, and arrangement [of the data] are sufficiently original to 
merit protection.‖143  Like works generally, many compilation works 
will easily clear this constitutional minimum, ―but not all will.‖144  
Specifically, ―[t]here remains a narrow category of works in which the 
creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent.‖145  Rural‘s alphabetically arranged phone number list falls 
into this latter, uncopyrightable category. 
What is striking, beyond the Court‘s conclusion that a ―white 
pages‖ book is too uncreative to pass constitutional muster, is the 
language Justice O‘Connor uses to describe the book‘s lack of 
 
unable to pass a creativity-based originality standard.‖).  Most pass over the distinction, but it is 
real. 
 137 The Copyright Act‘s signal requirement—―original works of authorship,‖ 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a) (2006) (emphasis added)—leaves ―original‖ undefined.  The Act‘s legislative history 
pegs the term ―original‖ to then-extant caselaw, at least some of which embraced a creativity 
standard.  See 2 PATRY, supra note 54, at § 3:26, at 3-75 to -78 (2007) (reviewing the relevant 
legislative history); Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, “Creativity,” and the 
Legislative History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 549, 579-85 (1995) (same).  
Importantly, ―[t]he Feist Court did not strip Congress of its voice on all originality issues; instead, 
the Court only set a threshold standard.  Congress is free to set a higher standard, or, in protecting 
particular types of works, to declare how the originality requirement must be satisfied.‖  William 
Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional 
Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 377 n.104 (1999).  My approach is, in effect, to explore 
the flexibility Congress has provided to the courts, for case-by-case development, in the statutory 
term ―original.‖ 
 138 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 139 Id. at 347. 
 140 Id. at 345 (quoting 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01(A), (B) (1990)). 
 141 Id. at 351-58, 360-61. 
 142 Id. at 352. 
 143 Id. at 358. 
 144 Id. at 359. 
 145 Id. 
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creativity.  As others have noted,146 the Court‘s language rings with 
patent-law overtones.  Although originality ―does not require that facts 
be presented in an innovative or surprising way[,] . . . the selection and 
arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to require no 
creativity whatsoever.‖147  Patent law, too, contrasts the nonobvious 
from the merely routine or mechanical.  Rural‘s listing book does not 
pass muster, as the Court explains in a passage that repeatedly uses 
patent law language: 
The selection, coordination, and arrangement of Rural‘s white pages 
do not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright 
protection.  As mentioned at the outset, Rural‘s white pages are 
entirely typical.  Persons desiring telephone service in Rural‘s 
service area fill out an application and Rural issues them a telephone 
number.  In preparing its white pages, Rural simply takes the data 
provided by its subscribers and lists it alphabetically by surname.  
The end product is a garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of 
even the slightest trace of creativity. 
 Rural‘s selection of listings could not be more obvious: It 
publishes the most basic information—name, town, and telephone 
number—about each person who applies to it for telephone service.  
This is ―selection‖ of a sort, but it lacks the modicum of creativity 
necessary to transform mere selection into copyrightable expression.  
Rural expended sufficient effort to make the white pages directory 
useful, but insufficient creativity to make it original. 
 . . . . 
 Nor can Rural claim originality in its coordination and 
arrangement of facts.  The white pages do nothing more than list 
Rural‘s subscribers in alphabetical order.  This arrangement may, 
technically speaking, owe its origin to Rural; no one disputes that 
Rural undertook the task of alphabetizing the names itself.  But there 
is nothing remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically in 
a white pages directory.  It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in 
tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a 
matter of course.  It is not only unoriginal, it is practically inevitable.  
This time-honored tradition does not possess the minimal creative 
spark required by the Copyright Act and the Constitution.148 
The Court‘s analysis is, admittedly, more a negative statement than 
an affirmative one, more a description of how Rural fell short than a 
description of how much creativity it takes to clear the constitutional 
minimum.  ―Feist itself does not promulgate a definition or a test for 
 
 146 See, e.g., EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 398-400 (2002); Russ VerSteeg & Paul K. 
Harrington, Nonobviousness as an Element of Copyrightability? (Or, Is the Jewel in the Lotus a 
Cubic Zirconia?), 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 331, 379-81 (1992). 
 147 499 U.S. at 362. 
 148 Id. at 362-63 (emphases added and citation omitted). 
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determining creativity.‖149  And yet, the Court‘s descriptors paint a 
picture: a fatally uncreative expressive work is typical, garden-variety, 
obvious, an age-old practice, traditional, commonplace, expected as a 
matter of course, practically inevitable.  All the same could just as 
easily be said of an obvious, and thus unpatentable, invention. 
It is to patent law‘s nonobviousness requirement that I now turn. 
 
C.     Patent’s Nonobviousness Demand 
 
Nonobviousness doctrine in the United States has a long, complex 
history.  I have summarized that history elsewhere,150 and Professor 
Duffy explores it at great length in his important Inventing Invention 
piece.151  For the current discussion, however, I need only highlight its 
Supreme Court endpoints—the first nonobviousness case, and the most 
recent (as of this writing). 
The modern nonobviousness requirement entered U.S. law with the 
Supreme Court‘s unanimous 1851 decision in Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood.152  Its author, Justice Nelson, had rendered the copyright 
decision in Jollie v. Jaque the year before.153  The contrast in Jollie, 
recall, was between the copyrightable composition that reflects ―genius‖ 
and the uncopyrightable work of a ―mere mechanic in music.‖154  
Justice Nelson drew a strikingly similar contrast in Hotchkiss. 
In Hotchkiss, the Court struck down a patent claim to a clay 
doorknob on the ground that the new doorknob configuration was too 
small an improvement to merit protection.155  The new configuration 
included a clay knob around a dovetail-based metal rod; the prior art 
included clay knobs with straight rods and metal or wood knobs with 
dovetail rods.156  The Court assumed, for purposes of argument, ―that, 
by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this 
well-known [dovetail] mode, an article is produced better and cheaper 
than in the case of the metallic or wood knob.‖157  Nevertheless, it held 
the new configuration to be unpatentable. 
 
 149 Abrams, supra note 61, at 15. 
 150 See Miller, supra note 68. 
 151 Duffy, supra note 72. 
 152 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).  For an engaging discussion of Hotchkiss and its place in 
the history of nonobviousness law, see Edward C. Walterscheid, The Hotchkiss Unobviousness 
Standard: Early Judicial Activism in the Patent Law, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 103 (2005). 
 153 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437) (Nelson, J.); see supra notes 85-93 and 
accompanying text. 
 154 Jollie, 13 F. Cas. at 913. 
 155 Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 266-67. 
 156 Id. at 265. 
 157 Id. at 266. 
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According to Justice Nelson, an invention is not patentable unless 
its achievement is marked by ―more ingenuity and skill . . . than were 
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business.‖158  
Justice Nelson contrasted ―the work of the skillful mechanic‖ with ―that 
of the inventor,‖159 whose more creative response to the problem at 
hand surpasses that which any ordinary mechanic would offer when 
confronted with the same problem.  Save for the problem-solving 
setting, Justice Nelson approached the question of patent law‘s requisite 
creativity in much the same way he approached copyright law‘s 
requisite creativity a year earlier. 
Congress first codified this nonobviousness requirement in 1952, 
as part of a larger overhaul of our patent statutes.160  The statute 
continues the ―functional approach‖ of Hotchkiss, mandating the same 
―comparison between the subject matter of the patent, or patent 
application, and the background skill of the calling.‖161  In 2007, the 
Supreme Court—for the first time in more than a generation—
reconsidered the fundamentals of nonobviousness.  The Court was 
prompted to do so by the long period during which the Federal Circuit 
had, in an understandable effort to prevent the nonobviousness inquiry 
from falling prey to the distortions of hindsight bias, made 
nonobviousness tantamount to ―not directly suggested.‖162  As I have 
discussed elsewhere, the flaw in this approach—from the Supreme 
Court‘s perspective—is that it assumed away too much of the ordinary 
artisan‘s capacity to generate new solutions when confronted with a 
problem.163  Some of those new solutions—the obvious ones—are 
insufficiently creative to merit patent protection.  To equate ―obvious‖ 
only with ―directly suggested‖ comes close to collapsing the 
nonobviousness requirement into a mere supernovelty test (i.e., a 
 
 158 Id. at 267. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1966) (describing the codification of 
Hotchkiss in 35 U.S.C. § 103). 
 161 Id. at 12.  Specifically, the statute provides as follows: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a 
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.  Patentability shall not be 
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made. 
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 162 In 2001, Professor Vermont described the prevailing approach to patent law‘s creativity 
threshold this way: ―[A]ny independent thought overcomes the obviousness bar.  If a mediocre 
artisan has to do more than read the prior art and myopically follow its suggestions, the invention 
is not obvious.‖  Samson Vermont, A New Way to Determine Obviousness: Applying the Pioneer 
Doctrine to 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), 29 AIPLA Q.J. 375, 389 n.22 (2001). 
 163 Joseph Scott Miller, Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237, 239, 244-50 
(2007). 
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novelty test applied over multiple pieces of prior art, rather than with a 
single prior art reference).164  That is a recipe for avoiding wrongful 
denials at the expense of far too many wrongful grants. 
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,165 the Supreme Court 
struck down a patent claim directed to the combination of two prior art 
technologies—an adjustable gas pedal and a pedal-mounted electronic 
sensor to link the pedal to a computer-controlled throttle.  Along the 
way, the Court emphasized its recognition that inventing solutions, even 
unpatentable ones, involves creative ability: ―A person of ordinary skill 
is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.‖166  But it 
cautioned, too, that ―[g]ranting patent protection to advances that would 
occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress,‖ 
rather than promoting it.167  What, then, separates the nonobvious wheat 
from the obvious chaff?  In a word, unconventionality.  Or, in another, 
unpredictability.  As Justice Kennedy explains: 
 ―The combination of familiar elements according to known 
methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than 
yield predictable results.‖168 
 ―[W]hen a patent claims a structure already known in the 
prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one 
element for another known in the field, the combination 
must do more than yield a predictable result.‖169 
 ―[W]hen the prior art teaches away from combining certain 
known elements, discovery of a successful means of 
combining them is more likely to be nonobvious.‖170 
 ―[A] court must ask whether the improvement is more than 
the predictable use of prior art elements according to their 
established functions.‖171 
When we place KSR‘s teachings alongside Feist‘s, the similarity is 
plain.  Both indicate that protectable creativity consists not of the 
typical, the obvious, the predictable, or the practically inevitable, but 
consists rather of the unconventional, the unpredicted, and the 
 
 164 See Miller, supra note 68, at 12; John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 496 
(2003). 
 165 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 166 Id. at 421; see also id. at 420 (―[I]n many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit 
the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.‖). 
 167 Id. at 419. 
 168 Id. at 416. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 417.  The examination guidelines the Patent & Trademark Office issued in response 
to KSR stress, throughout, the need to reject patent claims on inventions that reflect nothing more 
than predictable, conventional solutions to problems.  See Examination Guidelines for 
Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in View of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR 
International v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 57,526 (Oct. 10, 2007). 
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unorthodox.  By extending protection to creations in this wilder terrain, 
the patent and copyright regimes offer greater rewards to those who take 
greater risks.  By demanding more, rather than less, creativity as the 
price for exclusive rights, these regimes avoid the costlier error of 
wrongful grants (rather than fretting too much over wrongful denials).  
And by limiting rights-rewards to the unorthodox, these regimes do not 
trap us in a straightjacket of convention—aesthetic or otherwise—but 
help free us from such restraints. 
 
D.     Creativity’s Departure from the Conventional 
 
In Feist and KSR, the Supreme Court grappled with, and rejected, 
two claims to protection under the intellectual property laws—one 
under copyright, the other under patent.  In both cases, the Court offered 
guidance on the creativity necessary to obtain copyright or patent 
protection.  There are differences between the systems, to be sure.  But I 
am struck by the similarity in the Court‘s approach to these two similar 
questions about the creativity threshold for protection.  As Professor 
Heald observes in his provocative exploration of originality in the 
context of music composition and arrangement, ―[b]oth the copyright 
law originality requirement and the patent law non-obviousness 
requirement focus on whether the derivative work is the result of 
conventions familiar to creators working in the relevant culture.‖172 
Teachers in writing, painting, music, sculpture, photography, 
computer science, pottery, journalism, and film classes (and others 
besides)173 tutor their students daily in mastering the basic, routine 
expressive moves of their chosen medium.  Every domain of expression 
thus involves a large stock of conventional expressive moves.  
Moreover, people respond to situations more uniformly than a typically 
personality-centered view of human behavior would suggest.174  This 
 
 172 Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric, supra note 61, at 260; see also id. at 262-63 (―[A]fter Feist 
the question is . . . were these musicians of ‗reasonable talent‘ guided in writing similar alto lines 
by existing musical conventions?  A line dictated by accepted rules of composition would not be 
original, but if the rules permitted numerous harmonic possibilities or if the new alto part broke 
significantly from convention, then it would be original.‖). 
 173 For example, in working on this project, I happened upon a website that teaches, with 
supporting drawings, the ―grammatical and aesthetic traditions‖ for comic book lettering.  Nate 
Piekos, Comics Grammar & Tradition, BLAMBOT, http://www.blambot.com/grammar.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2009). 
 174 See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 174-88 
(1993) (explaining the fundamental attribution error, according to which people tend to 
overestimate the power of personality, and underestimate the power of situation, in explaining 
human behavior).  The most famous examples of the phenomenon at work, within experimental 
psychology, are the Milgrim shock-administration experiments and the Zimbardo prison role-
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strong influence of situation on behavior extends to expressive 
behavior, as even a few minutes at the web site Photo Clichés amply 
demonstrates.175  Stock expressive moves are part of the public domain 
in the sense that they need to be kept freely available to support a robust 
expressive ecology.176  And, despite how routinely individuals deploy 
these expressive moves, many of them surely embody more creativity 
than the constitutional minimum set forth in Feist.  As a result, our 
copyright system—the exclusion rights of which have greatly expanded 
both legally and technologically over the past thirty years—threatens to 
trigger infringement liability far too readily. 
Imagine, then, applying a more demanding statutory originality 
requirement for copyright: in this alternate world, copyright protects a 
work insofar as the author can show that the work departed from 
routine, typical, or conventional expression in the pertinent genre at the 
time he or she authored the work.  The expression need not be novel in 
the patent law sense, i.e., the author need not show that the expression is 
unprecedented; the accused infringer thus cannot negate the work‘s 
originality merely by showing that someone else produced the same 
expressive work at some point in the past (as one can in patent law).  
The expression must, however, be demonstrably atypical or 
unconventional in some respect, compared to common expression that 
dominated the genre when the author authored the work.  Only 
expression that is original in this sense is copyrightable on this new 
view. 
Copyright law, like patent law, can establish this higher creativity 
threshold primarily through case law development.177  The statutory 
term ―original‖ is not expressly defined, and is thus open to upward 
adjustment in light of profoundly changed technological environments, 
consistent with the remainder of the Copyright Act‘s text and 
purpose.178  Nothing in our copyright treaty obligations prevents U.S. 
courts from making the adjustment.179  Accused infringers should thus 
 
playing experiments.  See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING 
HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007). 
 175 Photo Clichés, http://www.photocliches.com/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).  The site 
describes its mission this way: ―Collecting pictures of people being uniquely hilarious, just like 
all the other people who took the same photo.‖  Id. 
 176 See generally Litman, supra note 51. 
 177 See Duffy, supra note 72 (recounting the historical development of nonobviousness law).  
The Copyright Office, unlike the Patent Office, does not engage in substantive examination of a 
registrant‘s underlying exclusion claim.  Given the low expected value of any given copyrightable 
work, and the high volume of copyrightable works being produced, it seems that an enforcement 
suit, rather than an elaborate administrative review, is the better forum for assessing originality.  
Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001). 
 178 See supra note 137. 
 179 The Berne Convention does not define the originality or creativity required for copyright, 
and certainly does not cap it at a particular level.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Berne 
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use Feist to frame a lack-of-originality defense.  Importantly, such a 
defense is more likely to prevail where the purported infringer provides 
a rich factual record that strongly demonstrates the defense‘s central 
premise—the purported copyright owner‘s expression is so utterly 
pedestrian, conventional, and obvious for its genre and time that, much 
like the white pages, it is fatally unoriginal.180  Courts will often benefit, 
no doubt, from expert testimony about routine, conventional expression 
embodied in publicly available works181 in the genre at a given time, 
and how the purportedly protectable work departs from those 
conventions.  With the parties‘ help, courts can meaningfully assess a 
target work‘s creative distance from its genre‘s typical work by asking 
tough questions on a thick fact record.182 
 
Convention];  see DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 130 (2006) (―Originality is often thought to be 
the touchstone of copyright requirements, although curiously it is not expressly mentioned in 
either TRIPs or the Berne Convention.‖).  Berne does refer to ―literary and artistic works,‖ Berne 
Convention, supra, at art. 2(1), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 31, and ―it is generally accepted that a work 
must be classified as fulfilling the criterion of originality or creativity in order to fall within the 
categories of production which are within the scope of the Convention.‖ J.A.L. STERLING, 
WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW § 7.06, at 337 (3d ed. 2008).  Berne also states that compilations are 
protectable, so long as they ―constitute intellectual creations‖ ―by reason of the selection and 
arrangement of their contents.‖  Berne Convention, supra, at art. 2(5), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 34.  
Indeed, at most Berne rules out the use of a ―sweat of the brow‖ test for protection, the very 
standard the Supreme Court rejected in Feist.  See Daniel J. Gervais, The Compatibility of the 
“Skill and Labour” Originality Standard with the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement, 
26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 75, 80 (2004) (―[T]he text and drafting history of the Berne 
Convention unequivocally demonstrate that the property test of originality is that the work must 
embody an author‘s creative input.‖).  My suggestion that we demand more creativity is, of 
course, plainly in keeping with the idea that we demand some creativity (rather than none)—as 
Feist holds, and Berne article 2(5) implies.  Like Berne, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) provides no definition of originality or creativity for 
determining copyright eligibility.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.  TRIPS article 10(2), on compilations, simply 
incorporates Berne article 2(5).  Id. art. 10(2), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 304.  (Ditto for article 5 of the 
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 152.)  More generally, TRIPS article 9(1) incorporates Berne articles 1-21 
wholesale.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra, at art. 
9(1), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 304. 
 180 Common experience in the phone-book world of 1991 helped the Justices see the 
originality problem in the Feist case more readily; in most domains, the accused infringer will 
face a much steeper factual climb to demonstrate fatal unoriginality to a busy judge unfamiliar 
with the genre in question. 
 181 Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (establishing categories of prior art that are used to establish a 
baseline state of the art for purposes of the nonobviousness inquiry prescribed in § 103). 
 182 Professor Madison‘s pattern-oriented approach to fair use strikes the same note: 
There is skepticism in some quarters about the competence of the judiciary to identify 
and interpret social practices meaningfully.  Courts certainly could do a better job of 
this than they have done in the past.  But the admonition that this is not a judicial 
function is off the mark; weakness in decision making arises not because judges are 
institutionally incapable of identifying and interpreting social practices, and in any 
event, judges ordinarily ought not to be asked to do so without help.  The investigation 
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Hoisting copyright‘s originality standard in the patent law direction 
has a benefit beyond helping us avoid now-costlier wasteful grants.  A 
more demanding originality standard, based on departure from the 
routine and conventional, also provides a common explanatory 
grounding for disparate strands of copyright doctrine that likewise deny 
protection to that which is conventional, routine, or dictated by 
circumstance.  For example, under the scènes à faire doctrine, 
―expressions indispensable and naturally associated with the treatment 
of a given idea ‗are treated like ideas and are therefore not protected by 
copyright.‘‖183  If one author could protect such stock expressions, ―the 
net of liability would be cast too wide; authors would find it impossible 
to write without obtaining a myriad of copyright permissions.‖184  On 
my approach to originality, this doctrine deals with a limiting case of 
plainly unprotectable, highly conventional material.  Similarly, the 
music copyright cases denying protection to common harmonic 
progressions185 or conventional arrangements186 are music-specific 
applications of a more general standard.  And cases applying the merger 
doctrine—under which ―even expression is not protected in those 
instances where there is only one or so few ways of expressing an idea 
that protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to 
the idea itself‖187—are instances where the range of intelligible 
conventional expression is especially narrow.  Cases in which faithful 
 
that I suggest be pursued ought, in the first instance, to be the task of the parties.  
Judges rarely need to be anthropologists.  Lawyers do, and they do so all the time.  
Creating a proper record is, among other things, an anthropological or archaeological 
exercise.  A proper record goes a long way to good judicial decision making, and 
having a coherent set of questions to ask goes a long way toward making a proper 
record. 
Madison, supra note 19, at 1640-41 (footnotes omitted).  I am grateful he highlighted the point 
for me. 
 183 Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Apple Computer, 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Walker v. Time Life Films, 
Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (―Elements such as drunks, prostitutes, vermin and derelict 
cars would appear in any realistic work about the work of policemen in the South Bronx.  These 
similarities therefore are unprotectible as ‗scenes a faire,‘ that is, scenes that necessarily result 
from the choice of a setting or situation.‖). 
 184 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.). 
 185 Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (collecting cases) (―The plaintiff has 
not presented any evidence contradicting his own expert‘s assessment of the ubiquity of the III, II 
harmonic progression.  Virtually by definition, expressions that are common are also unoriginal.  
So it is here: this harmonic progression, which is a stereotypical building block of musical 
composition, lacks originality.  Accordingly, it is unprotectable.‖ (internal citations omitted)). 
 186 Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in relevant part, 60 
F.3d 978, 991-93 (2d Cir. 1995); Smith v. George E. Muehlenbach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp. 
729, 731 (W.D. Mo. 1956). 
 187 Kregos v. Assoc. Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991); see, e.g., New York Mercantile 
Exch. Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 116-18 (2d Cir. 2007); Allen v. 
Academic Games League of America, Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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depiction of an external item is the central expressive value involve that 
narrowest range of conventional expression.188 
Hoisting originality also embraces the insight, pioneered in the 
derivative works context, that copyright protection presupposes a 
material difference between the work for which an exclusion right is 
sought and public domain material.189  The public domain includes 
conventional, pedestrian expression for the genre (this is Feist‘s central 
insight), and a too-low statutory originality standard sweeps in too much 
of this material by assuming that the problem of creative distance is 
limited to derivative works.  The problem is not limited to derivative 
works, as, for example, the Seventh Circuit has recently suggested.190 
The best example of the analysis I propose would comprise a thick 
factual record of contemporaneous expression in a target genre for 
assessing a given work.  I have not yet developed a comprehensive case 
study of this type.  Instead, I can offer here three illustrative items: a 
trial court case that hints at an analysis along the lines I suggest, an 
appellate case that passes up a seemingly promising chance to conduct 
such an analysis, and a recent story about a photographer who makes 
computed tomography (CT) scan images of common objects. 
In Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp.,191 a 
printing company that specialized in printing Chinese restaurant menus 
sued another printing company for copyright infringement.  The 
plaintiffs asserted copyrights in, among other things, ―photographs of 
several common, but unlabeled, Chinese food dishes.‖192  
Acknowledging that under current originality doctrine ―[t]he required 
creativity is small,‖193 the district court concluded that the food photos 
were fatally uncreative.  Specifically, ―as the president of both plaintiff 
companies . . . concedes, [the photos] depict the ‗most common Chinese 
 
 188 See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264-68 (10th 
Cir. 2008); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ‘g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 688 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 189 Entm‘t Research Group v. Genesis Creative Group, 122 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (‖[T]he purpose of 
the term [‗original‘] in copyright law is not to guide aesthetic judgments but to assure a 
sufficiently gross difference between the underlying and the derivative work to avoid entangling 
subsequent artists depicting the underlying work in copyright problems.‖); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. 
v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (―We do follow the school of cases in this circuit and 
elsewhere supporting the proposition that to support a copyright there must be at least some 
substantial variation, not merely a trivial variation such as might occur in the translation to a 
different medium.‖). 
 190 Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Posner, J.) (―Copyright law unlike patent law does not require substantial originality.  In fact, it 
requires only enough originality to enable a work to be distinguished from similar works that are 
in the public domain, since without some discernible distinction it would be impossible to 
determine whether a subsequent work was copying a copyrighted work or a public-domain 
work.‖ (citations omitted)). 
 191 175 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d in part, 34 Fed. Appx. 401 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 192 Id. at 544. 
 193 Id. at 546. 
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dishes used in take-out menu [sic].‘‖194  These ―direct depictions of the 
most common Chinese food dishes as they appear on the plates served 
to customers at restaurants,‖ the district court found, ―lack any artistic 
quality, and neither the nature and content of such photographs, nor 
plaintiffs‘ description of their preparation, give the Court any reason to 
believe that any ‗creative spark‘ was required to produce them.‖195  The 
analysis in this case is on the right track, because it links creativity with 
a departure from convention.  Finding none, it rejects the claim to 
copyrightability.  It would, I think, have been better to ensure, with 
example photographs from the Chinese menu item genre, that the 
plaintiff‘s photos were as conventional as the trial judge supposed.  But 
that shortcoming is evidentiary, rather than analytical. 
In a more recent dispute between two management consulting 
companies,196 the First Circuit missed a good opportunity to conduct a 
more searching creativity inquiry about the originality of the plaintiff‘s 
management training workbooks on communication and negotiation—
an inquiry the district court had conducted, albeit awkwardly, below.  
As was the case with Oriental Art Printing, one concern I have about 
the state of the record in this dispute is the seeming lack of evidence 
about exemplars in the genre against which to assess the asserted 
copyrights.  The most troubling aspect of the case, however, is the 
successful use of (from my vantage point) a highly suspect copyright 
claim to bankrupt a new competitor197 started by departed former 
employees after their noncompetition agreements had expired.198  The 
district court described plaintiff Situation Management Systems, Inc.‘s 
(SMS) training workbooks, the three copyrighted works in suit, this 
way: 
These works exemplify the sorts of training programs that serve as 
fodder for sardonic workplace humor that has given rise to the 
popular television show The Office and the movie Office Space.  
They are aggressively vapid—hundreds of pages filled with 
generalizations, platitudes, and observations of the obvious.199 
Further: ―At their creative zenith, these works translate common-sense 
communication skills into platitudinal business speak.‖200  One can, if 
one chooses, fairly read the district court‘s rationale for concluding that 
 
 194 Id. (quoting a witness declaration). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Situation Mgmt. Sys. v. ASP Consulting Group, 535 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Mass. 2008), 
rev’d, 560 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 197 See 560 F.3d at 58 (―The cost of defending this suit, ASP represents, has rendered it 
insolvent.‖). 
 198 Id. at 56 (describing defendant ASP‘s formation and competitor status). 
 199 535 F. Supp. 2d at 239 (footnote omitted). 
 200 Id. at 241. 
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the workbooks were fatally unoriginal as one, like Feist, focused on the 
utter banality and conventionality of the works. 
The First Circuit, for its part, rejected the district court‘s analysis 
as erroneous self-indulgence in personal aesthetics and improper 
reliance on patent law concepts.  According to the First Circuit, the trial 
judge, 
erroneously treated copyright law‘s originality requirement as 
functionally equivalent to a novelty standard. . . .  Moreover, the 
district court‘s originality analysis was obviously tainted by its own 
subjective assessment of the works‘ creative worth.  Its assessment 
of originality displayed nothing but pejorative disdain for the value 
of SMS‘s works. . . .  Yet neither the works‘ absolute novelty nor 
their creative value determines whether they are original for purposes 
of copyright protection.201 
―Pejorative disdain‖ would, of course, be cause for concern.  But I 
see no more disdain in the trial court‘s rejection of banal workbooks 
than in the Supreme Court‘s rejection of banal white pages.  The First 
Circuit, though, is devoted to a low statutory originality standard: 
―SMS‘s works easily satisfy the originality requirement for copyright 
protection.‖202  This is a missed opportunity.  The district court‘s 
intuition, from first hand review of the workbooks, certainly warranted 
greater analysis based on comparisons to other workbooks of the type 
from the relevant time period.  I concede, though, that it is not clear that 
the resources existed to improve the evidentiary record on remand, 
given that SMS had successfully driven defendant ASP Consulting 
Group into bankruptcy. 
A final example: Consider the below photograph of a common 
object.  It strikes me, at the outset, as unconventional expression (in 
great contrast to Mr. Garcia‘s photo of then-Senator Obama).  The New 
York Times wrote about the photographer, ―an artist-turned-medical-
student‖ Satre Stuelke, in March 2009.203  This particular work is 
Stuelke‘s CT scan photo of a rubber duck squeak toy; Stuelke has called 
it ―radiology art.‖204  According to the Times story, Stuelke manipulates 
the CT scanner‘s ―200 to 500 image slices‖ with ―a computer program 
that allows him to assign different colors to areas of different 
density.‖205  My admittedly untutored view is that these photos are 
unconventionally creatively expressive for a posed pop photo genre (if 
that is the right genre, which it may not be).  The ultimate assessment 
 
 201 560 F.3d at 60. 
 202 Id. (emphasis added). 
 203 Amanda Schaffer, The Inner Beauty of a McNugget: A Cultural Scan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
23, 2009, at D4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/science/24scan.html. 
 204 See Radiology Art, http://www.radiologyart.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2009). 
 205 Schaffer, supra note 203. 
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turns on a properly developed set of facts, but I think Stuelke‘s photos 
offer a helpful pointer toward what I suggest. 
 
 
Satre Stuelke, Aug. 2008 
 
Admittedly, the prevailing ―tiniest dash will do‖ approach to 
originality has become quite ingrained in the copyright system.206  
Hoisting originality will be hard, if it happens at all.  Another factor 
that, I suspect, adds to the difficulty, pulling down on copyright‘s 
creativity threshold, is the lack of a creator‘s attribution right in U.S. 
law.207  The desire to honor a creator‘s effort with credit is, in our 
cultural tradition, readily felt: ―[F]ew interests seem as fundamentally 
intuitive as that authorship credit should be given where credit is 
due.‖208  Authors, for their part, may create with a moral right to credit 
very much in mind.  From my own experience, I agree with Professor 
Lastowka‘s recent suggestion that ―[p]romoting personal reputation 
within a particular community is certainly not the sole motivator for 
open copyright production, but I would wager that it is among the top 
 
 206 See, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) (―When this 
articulation of the minimal threshold for copyright protection [in Feist] is combined with the 
minimal standard of originality required for photographic works, the result is that even the 
slightest artistic touch will meet the originality test for a photograph.‖). 
 207 Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 
41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 266 (2004) (―[I]n the United States neither the copyright nor the 
trademarks laws establish a right of attribution generally applicable to all creators of all types of 
works of authorship.‖). 
 208 Id. at 264.  See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of 
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49 (2006). 
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two.‖209  Importantly, as Professor Heymann describes, copyright 
owners—and the courts that, understandably, sympathize with them—
have used copyright‘s exclusion power to achieve attribution-related 
ends, lacking an attribution right for achieving those ends directly.210  
Copyright‘s now-low statutory originality standard and the felt moral 
claims of authors have thus become a bit entangled. 
Separating attribution and originality assessments is important, 
both for itself and—in my view—for removing the downward pressure 
that attribution-recognition-desire puts on originality.  As Professor 
Kwall has explained with great clarity, an author‘s moral claim to 
attribution and integrity comes from authorship itself, not from the 
resulting work‘s creative distance from, or similarity to, other works in 
the genre: 
Although authors freely borrow from the landscape of existing 
cultural production, a work of creative authorship nonetheless 
manifests the author‘s individual process of creativity and artistic 
autonomy.  Indeed, the very act of authorship entails an infusion of 
the creator‘s mind, heart, and soul into her work.211 
Providing independent legal protection for attribution and integrity 
claims212 thus ―reaffirm[s] the author‘s work as a reflection of its creator 
and a testament to the author‘s autonomy and dignity.‖213  We can 
reaffirm an author‘s sound moral claim to credit without reaching a 
conclusion, one way or the other, about the work‘s compliance with the 
statutory originality standard; the questions are analytically distinct. 
Professor Kwall has argued that, in a framework with a low 
originality standard (as we now have), ―only those works satisfying a 
heightened standard of originality should qualify for [moral rights] 
protection‖214: 
[A] perspective of creativity grounded in inspirational or spiritual 
motivations emphasizes the intrinsic dimension of the creative 
process.  The focus of this perspective is on the author‘s relationship 
to his work and his sense of personal satisfaction or fulfillment 
 
 209 Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41, 
58 (2007); see also id. at 58 n.95 (―With regard to the other contender, my personal intuition is 
that the intrinsic enjoyment of creative production has always produced and will always produce 
the majority of the material that copyright protects.‖). 
 210 Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55 (2007). 
 211 Kwall, Originality in Context, supra note 61, at 873. 
 212 See Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation, supra note 61, at 1972 (―The most prominent 
components of moral rights laws are the right of attribution and the right of integrity.  The right of 
attribution safeguards the author‘s right to be recognized as the creator of her work and prevents 
others from being falsely designated as the author.  The right of integrity guarantees that the 
author‘s work truly represents her creative personality and is free of distortions that misrepresent 
her creative expression.‖). 
 213 Kwall, Originality in Context, supra note 61, at 873. 
 214 Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation, supra note 61, at 1998. 
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resulting from the act of creativity itself. . . .  Moral rights 
protections are designed to recognize this intrinsic dimension of 
creativity.  In light of these considerations, the legislative standard 
for moral rights should require ―substantial‖ creativity in lieu of 
Feist‘s ―modicum of creativity.‖215 
On this approach, she would leave the originality standard where it is 
and provide moral rights to more highly creative works.  My own 
intuition is the reverse: attribution and integrity rights are better directed 
to protecting authors whose works fall below an appropriately more 
demanding statutory originality standard for copyright protection.  Even 
as we raise the originality standard, we should consider providing 
attribution rights to admittedly less creative, but nonetheless personally 
authored, works.  In any event, if courts hoist statutory originality, the 
pressure to recognize counterbalancing attribution rights will surely 
rise.216 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Legal and technological changes have rendered copyright creation 
and infringement pervasive.  Originality, the gateway to copyright‘s 
exclusion power, needs hoisting to avert what is now the more socially 
costly error—copyright grants that are not needed to incent creation.  
We can hoist originality by analogy to nonobviousness, protecting an 
expressive work insofar as the author can show that the work departed 
from routine, typical, or conventional expression in the pertinent genre 
at the time he or she authored the work.  And by doing so, we focus 
copyright‘s protection on those who succeed by taking the greater risk 
of investing in unconventional, unorthodox expression.  These 
boundary-breaking creators, dissenters of a sort, do more to foster 
progress.217  Having succeeded where others feared, or simply failed, to 
 
 215 Id. at 2001-02; see also Kwall, Originality in Context, supra note 61, at 874-75, 883-98. 
 216 Professor Loren notes a similar dynamic in connection with her proposal to modulate the 
scope of copyright protection according to whether ―the driving motivation for the creation of 
[the] works is unrelated to copyright protection.‖  Loren, supra note 40, at 2, 3, 11-12. 
 217 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).  Defending the 
need for freedom of opinion and freedom of expression, Mill observed that, ―since the general or 
prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of 
adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.‖ JOHN STUART 
MILL, ON LIBERTY 64 (Macmillan Pub. Co. 1956) (1859).  If we focus originality on unorthodox 
expression, we better align copyright with free expression values.  Late in his life, Justice 
Douglas offered a First Amendment meditation congenial to my project: 
  The struggle of man to be unafraid of ideas has marked human history.  The 
conventional has always plagued us; it has conditioned us to one way of thinking.  Our 
prejudices become rooted in folklore. 
  The curious man—the dissenter—the innovator—the one who taunts and teases or 
makes a caricature of our prejudices is often our salvation.  Yet throughout history he 
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go, they are more likely to inspire destructively imitative competition.  
They are the worthier claimants to copyright‘s protective power. 
 
has been burned or booed, hanged or exiled, imprisoned or tortured, for pricking the 
bubble of contemporary dogma. 
  The writer and the thinker are the ones who frequently show that a current attitude 
is little more than witchcraft.  They may do in art, in business, in literature, in human 
relations, in political theory what Darwin did with biology, Freud and Jung with the 
subconscious, Einstein and Rutherford with physics.  This folklore or mythology by 
which we all live needs challengers, doubters, and dissenters lest we become prisoners 
of it.  We need those who provoke us so that we may be warned of the fate that our 
prejudices or ignorance or wishful thinking may hold in store for us.  It was Keynes, I 
believe, who said that ―the difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the 
old ones.‖ 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, FREEDOM OF THE MIND 32 (1964).  The conventions of expression, no 
less than the ideas expressed, can only benefit from the challenges that transgressions from them 
offer. 
